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SETTING THE RULES OF THE GAME: 
THE RISE (AND FALL) OF MEGA-
REGIONALS, DEEP INTEGRATION AND 
THE ROLE OF THE WTO 
Billy A. Melo Araujo∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Faced with a World Trade Organization (WTO) in a state of paralysis, 
large developed trading nations have shifted their attentions to other fora to 
pursue their trade policy objectives.  In particular, preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) are now used to promote the regulatory disciplines that 
were previously rejected by developing countries at the multilateral level.  
These “deep” or “twenty-first century” PTAs address a variety of issues, 
from technical norms, procurement, investment protection, and intellectual 
property rights to social and environmental protection.  Moreover, 
developed countries have recently sought to negotiate highly controversial 
PTAs that are large in scale, both in terms of economic size and 
geographical reach, including the “mega-regional” PTAs, such as the EU-
US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the EU-Japan PTA, the 
Transpacific Partnership, and the China-backed Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership.  These mega-regional PTAs are distinctive not only 
in terms of their sheer size and the breadth and depth of issues addressed, 
but also because some of their proponents readily admit that one of the 
central aims pursued by such agreements is to design global rules on new 
trade issues.  In other words, these agreements are conceived as alternatives 
                                               
∗ Lecturer, Queen’s University Belfast (B.Melo-Araujo@qub.ac.uk).  This Article was 
prepared for the International Legal Theory Colloquium organized by the Institute for 
International Law and Justice of the New York University School of Law in Spring 2016.  I 
am very grateful to Professor Grainne De Burca, Professor Benedict Kingsbury and the rest of 
the colloquium participants for their insightful comments on an earlier draft 
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to multilateral rule-making at the WTO level.  The proliferation of twenty-
first century trade deals raises important questions concerning the continued 
relevance of the WTO as a global rule-making venue, and the impact that the 
regulatory disciplines promoted in such agreements will have on both 
developing and developed countries. 
This Article discusses the emerging features of an international trading 
system that is increasingly populated by large-scale PTAs and discusses 
some of the points of tension that arise from such practice.  Firstly, this 
Article examines the extent to which the proliferation of PTAs represents a 
threat to multilateral trade governance.  Second, this Article discusses the 
manner in which the imposition of regulatory disciplines through trade 
agreements can undermine the ability of countries to pursue legitimate 
public interest objectives.  Finally, this Article proposes a number of steps 
that should be considered to address some of the adverse effects associated 
with the fragmentation of the international trading system; of particular 
focus is the option of embracing variable geometry within the WTO 
framework and the need to develop mechanisms that provide flexibility for 
developing countries in the implementation of regulatory disciplines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the launch of its Doha Development Round of negotiations (Doha 
Round), the World Trade Organization (WTO) has not had the easiest of 
times.  The Doha Round was billed as an opportunity for the WTO to 
maximize the gains that could be made by developing countries from trade 
liberalization by addressing issues such as agricultural subsidies, non-
agricultural market access, and trade facilitation.1  As the fanfare died down, 
fundamental disagreements within the membership as to the future direction 
of the WTO were exposed, and it soon became apparent that a new wave of 
multilateral trade agreements would not be forthcoming in the short term.  
While developing countries remained adamant that the Doha Round focus 
exclusively on “development” issues, advanced industrialized economies 
such as the European Union (the EU) and the United States demanded 
comprehensive reforms on a number of topics.2  One of the main areas of 
contention concerned developed country demands for the adoption of 
disciplines on non-discriminatory regulation on issues such as competition, 
services, investment protection, and procurement.  The internationalization 
of supply chains over the past two decades and the success of the WTO in 
cutting tariffs mean that addressing regulatory barriers to trade has become a 
main focus of trade policy for the western trade powers.3  However, 
developing countries have steadfastly refused to countenance such 
                                               
1  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration adopted of 14 November 2001, 
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002). 
2  See Andreas Falke, EU–USA Trade Relations in the Doha Development Round: Market 
Access versus a Post-modern Trade Policy Agenda, 10 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 339 (2005); 
Will Martin & Patrick Messerlin, Why Is It so Difficult? Trade Liberalization under the Doha 
Agenda, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 347 (2007); Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of 
Development in the Doha Round Negotiations 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 573 (2010); Susan C. 
Schwab, After Doha: Why the Negotiations Are Doomed and What We Should Do About It, 
FOREIGN AFF.  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-04-09/after-doha 
[https://perma.cc/QV3X-BEBL] (last visited Fed. 18, 2017); David Kleimann & Joe Guinan, 
The Doha Round: An Obituary, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME POL’Y BRIEF (European 
Univ. Inst., Robert Schuman Ctr. Advanced Studies) (2011). 
3  See generally Richard Baldwin, Trade and Industrialization after Globalization’s Second 
Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different and Why It Matters, in 
GLOBALIZATION IN AN AGE OF CRISIS: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 165 (Robert C. Feenstra & Alan M. Taylor, eds., 2013); Kenneth 
Heydon, The Political Economy of International Trade, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH 
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 29 (Kenneth Heydon & Stephen Woolcock, 
eds., 2012). 
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proposals.4  The rejection of regulatory disciplines and the push for the 
establishment of common regulatory frameworks are not only a consequence 
of the desire of developing countries to focus the attention of the WTO on 
issues that matter to them (e.g., reduction in tariffs and subsidies), but also 
reveal a deep-rooted unease concerning the intrusion of international trade 
politics into areas that have hitherto been the preserve of national 
sovereignty.5 
These conflicting views partially explain why the Doha Round stalled 
for more than a decade.  Faced with a WTO in a state of paralysis, large 
developed trading nations have shifted their attentions to other venues.  In 
particular, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are now used to promote the 
regulatory disciplines rejected by developing countries at the multilateral 
level.  These “deep” or “twenty-first century” PTAs address a variety of 
issues, from technical norms, procurement, investment protection, and 
intellectual property rights to social and environmental protection.  The first 
generation of these deep PTAs were mostly bilateral and concluded between 
developed and developing countries where the former could use their 
superior bargaining power to push their regulatory agendas through.6  By 
using the carrot of enhanced market access, developed countries have been 
able to commit developing countries to regulatory issues.7  More recently, 
however, developed countries have sought to negotiate PTAs that are large 
in scale, both in terms of economic size and geographical reach, including 
the “mega-regional” PTAs, such as the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU-Japan PTA, the Transpacific 
Partnership (TPP), and the China-backed Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP)8  These mega-regional PTAs are distinctive 
not only in terms of their sheer size and the breadth and depth of issues 
                                               
4  Simon J. Evenett, Five Hypotheses Concerning the Fate of the Singapore Issues in the 
Doha Round, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 392 (2007); Kevin P. Gallagher, Understanding 
Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round, 15 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 62 (2007). 
5  Id. 
6  Peter Drahos, Weaving Webs of Influence: The United States, Free Trade Agreements 
and Dispute Resolution, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 200 (2007). 
7  See L. Alan Winters, The WTO and Regional Trade Agreements: Is It All Over for 
Multilateralism? 10 (European Univ. Inst., Robert Schuman Ctr. Advanced Studies Working 
Paper RSCAS 2015/94, 2015). 
8  Vinod K. Aggarwal & Simon J. Evenett, A Fragmenting Global Economy: A Weakened 
WTO, Mega FTAs, and Murky Protectionism, 19 SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 550, 550 (2013); 
Melissa Griffith, Richard Steinberg & John Zysman, Great Power Politics in a Global 
Economy: Origins and Consequences of the TPP and TTIP (Oct. 17, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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addressed, but also because some of their proponents readily admit that one 
of the central aims pursued by such agreements is to design global rules on 
new trade issues.  In other words, these agreements—alongside plurilateral 
trade agreements such as the Trade in Services Agreement (“TiSA”)9—are 
conceived as alternatives to multilateral rule-making at the WTO level.  
Accordingly, the proliferation of twenty-first century trade deals raises 
important questions concerning the continued relevance of the WTO as a 
global rule-making venue and the impact that the regulatory disciplines 
promoted in such agreements will have on both developing and developed 
countries. 
The Introduction of this Article maps out the emerging features of an 
international trading system that is increasingly populated by large-scale 
PTAs promoting regulatory disciplines, and discusses some of the points of 
tension that arise from such practice. 
Part I provides a descriptive overview of the evolution of the 
international trading system.  First, this Part explains how recent changes in 
global commerce have led developed countries to shift the focus of trade 
politics away from the removal of border and discriminatory measures and 
towards the disciplining of non-discriminatory domestic regulation.  Their 
attempts to introduce regulatory disciplines within the realm of international 
trade law, however, were not well received by developing countries, which 
led to the eventual petering out of the Doha Round.  The upshot of this 
conflict has been the fragmentation of the international trading system as 
developed countries are now increasingly resorting to PTAs to achieve their 
trade policy goals.  This Part makes use of theoretical frameworks, including 
“contested multilateralism” and “regime complexity,” to make sense of this 
trajectory from an integrated to a fragmented legal system. 
Part II explores two competing visions for the international trade 
system.  The first would go beyond what is provided in the WTO by 
disciplining domestic regulation.  The second vision seeks to maintain the 
status quo.  In particular, this Part examines the type of regulatory 
disciplines that are being included in PTAs.  It first looks at the type of rules 
included in PTAs concluded by the European Union and the United States, 
the main proponents of deep integration at WTO level.  Subsequently, this 
Part contrasts these PTAs against the approach taken by emerging 
                                               
9  United States Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk Notifies 
Congress of Intent to Negotiate New International Trade Agreement on Services, OFF. U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2013/january/ustr-kirk-notifies-congress-new-itas-negotiations 
[https://perma.cc/C3ZE-FTW9].  
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economies, such as China, which opposed reform proposals submitted by 
developed countries in the Doha Round. 
Part III discusses some of the main challenges faced by the international 
trading system as a consequence of these changes.  This Part examines 
instances of horizontal tension resulting from the proliferation of PTAs, 
particularly the extent to which such PTAs represent a threat to multilateral 
trade governance.  Second, it looks at  examples of vertical tension by 
examining the manner in which the imposition of regulatory disciplines 
through trade agreements can undermine the ability of countries, especially 
developing countries, to pursue legitimate public interest objectives.  Finally, 
this section considers possible steps that could be taken to address some of 
the adverse effects associated with the fragmentation of the international 
trading system, including the option of embracing variable geometry within 
the WTO framework and the need to develop mechanisms that provide 
flexibility for developing countries in the implementation of regulatory 
disciplines. 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 
A. From Shallow to Deep Integration 
The international trading regime developed in the aftermath of the 
Second World War and embodied by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT 1947”)10, was one based on shallow (or negative) 
integration,11 a model of economic integration that requires parties to 
remove discriminatory barriers to trade.  Members of GATT 1947 were 
enjoined to reduce border measures—notably tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions—and to comply with the principle of non-discrimination, which 
encompassed the most favored nation (MFN) rule (prohibiting 
discrimination between goods of the members of the organization)12 and the 
                                               
10  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, July 1986, 61 Stat. pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
11  ROBERT LAWRENCE, ALBERT BRESSAND & TAKATOSHI ITO, A VISION FOR THE WORLD 
ECONOMY: OPENNESS, DIVERSITY AND COHESION 5 (Brookings Institution 1996); Beth A. 
Simmons, From Unilateralism to Bilateralism: Challenges for the Multilateral Trade System, 
in MULTILATERALISM UNDER CHALLENGE? POWER, INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE, 441, 442–43 (Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur & John Tirman eds., 2006); Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, From Negative to Positive Integration in the WTO: Time for 
Mainstreaming Human Rights into WTO Law, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV., issue 6, 1363, 1363 
(2000). 
12  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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national treatment rule (prohibiting discrimination between domestic and 
imported goods).13  But while GATT 1947 members were required to 
eliminate discriminatory trade barriers, there were no rules constraining their 
ability to determine the content of domestic regulation.14 
For much of the twentieth century, negative integration remained the 
main objective of international trade law, with successive rounds of GATT 
negotiations focusing on the reduction of tariffs worldwide.15  However, 
beginning in the 1970s, it became apparent that trade liberalization could no 
longer be conceived exclusively in terms of eliminating barriers resulting 
from border measures, but should also seek to discipline non-discriminatory 
“behind-the-border” measures affecting trade.  This realization was in part 
due to the GATT’s success in removing tariff barriers that had previously 
obscured the role of domestic regulation as barriers to trade.  Although most 
domestic rules are adopted to pursue legitimate public interest goals, it is not 
uncommon for countries to use their domestic regimes for protectionist 
purposes, such as implementing technical barriers to trade (TBTs) that 
regulate production in order to achieve health, safety, and environmental 
goals.16  As a consequence, trade policy has progressively moved away from 
the negative integration approach associated with GATT 1947 towards 
“positive integration” (or “deep integration”) models where greater emphasis 
is placed on disciplining domestic regulation, particularly through the 
development of common market rules and policies.17 
This process was further accelerated by fundamental changes in the 
structure of the global economy.  First, while the world of GATT 1947 was 
dominated by trade in goods, the latter part of the twentieth century was 
                                               
13  Id. at art. 3. 
14  Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law, 38(1) J. OF 
WORLD TRADE 1 (2004). 
15  JOHN W. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: THE TWILIGHT OF 
THE GATT? (1971); J. Michael Finger, GATT Tariff Concessions and the Exports of 
Developing Countries—United States Concessions at the Dillon Round, 84 ECON. J., no. 335, 
556 (1974). 
16  MIROSLAV JOVANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 5–10 (2d ed., 
Routledge 1998); Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of the World Trading System – The 
Economic and Policy Context, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 6, 17 
(Daniel Bethelehem, Isabelle Van Damme, Donald McRae & Rodney Neufeld eds., 2009); 
Chad P. Brown, Trade Policy Instruments over Time, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 57, 71 (Lisa L. Martin ed., 2015); Heiskanen, 
supra note 14, at 5–6. 
17  ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND DEEPER INTEGRATION 
(Brookings Institution 2000). 
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defined by the rise of trade in services.  Consequently, domestic rules tend to 
represent the biggest obstacles to trade in services because such products 
rarely pass through customs controls.  Instead, they are delivered through 
other means such as e-trade, the temporary movement of persons, and the 
establishment of permanent commercial presences in host countries.18 
The other fundamental change, which occurred from the 1980s onwards, 
was the result of advances in transportation logistics and information 
technology that increased the global mobility of firms.19  The 
“internationalization of supply chains”20—that is, the ability of firms to 
perform offshore manufacturing and to establish processing facilities across 
the world—means that the domestic regulatory environment of countries has 
become a prevalent concern in international trade politics, especially given 
that domestic regulations that limit market access have the potential to 
negatively impact a country’s ability to attract foreign investment.  For 
example, market access may be undermined by burdensome establishment 
requirements, by the absence of an effective antitrust legal system, or by the 
deficient enforcement of intellectual property laws.  Even mere regulatory 
divergences between countries may increase the costs of market access for 
foreign firms, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage compared to 
domestic economic operators.21  Trade policy has responded to these 
changes with a growing emphasis on enhancing market contestability and 
minimizing “the regulatory constraints to enter, operate in and exit from 
markets.”22  In this vein, deeper integration aims to go beyond non-
discrimination requirements by improving both market contestability and 
rules of operation for multinational firms by requiring the adoption of rules 
that guarantee tangible and intangible property as well as a favorable 
                                               
18  JOHN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 4 (Am. Enter. Inst. 1998); Juan Marchetti & Petros Mavroidis, What Are the 
Main Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk About Revolution, 5(3) EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 547 (2004). 
19  Paul J. Welfens, Globalization of the Economy and International Organizations: 
Developments, Issues and Policy Options for Reform, in ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 13–33 (Richard Tilly & Paul 
Welfens eds., 2000). 
20  Richard Baldwin, Policy Insight No. 64, WTO 2.0: Global Governance of Supply Chain 
Trade, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH 5 (2010). See also Richard Baldwin, WTO 
2.0: Governance of 21st Century Trade 9(2) THE REV. INT. ORG. 261 (2014). 
21  LAWRENCE ET. AL., supra note 11, at 49–52. 
22  Bernard Hoekman & Michael Kostecki, Towards Deeper Integration? The ‘Trade and’ 
Agenda 414, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: WTO AND 
BEYOND (Bernard Hoekman & Michael Kostecki eds., 2008). 
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business climate.23 
The trend towards deep integration eventually led to the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round Negotiations and the creation of the WTO.  
The WTO revolutionized international trade law not only by establishing a 
truly multilateral trading regime with a dispute settlement mechanism 
capable of issuing legally binding rulings, but also because it represented a 
shift away from the focus on negative integration and towards positive rule-
making whereby WTO members are required to adopt common rules.24  The 
most notable example of deep integration within WTO law can be found in 
the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS),25 which requires members to adopt minimum standards of 
intellectual property protection and enforcement.26 
There have been subsequent efforts to further pursue deep integration 
within the realm of WTO law.  For example, in 1996, the European Union 
proposed the negotiation of multilateral agreements on investment, 
procurement, competition, and trade facilitation (“Singapore Issues”).27 The 
United States had also previously demanded the introduction of labor 
standards within the WTO and consistently demanded the enhancement of 
intellectual property rights protection and enforcement standards.28  While 
some of these issues were included in the negotiation agenda of the Doha 
Round in 2001, all but trade facilitation would eventually be removed, 
mostly (though not exclusively) at the request of developing countries, most 
of which were unwilling to engage in another round of onerous and time-
consuming WTO-induced regulatory reforms.  These reforms were not only 
                                               
23  Baldwin, WTO 2.0: Governance of the 21st Century Trade, supra note 21, at 266. 
24  William Dymond & Michael Hart, Post-Modern Trade Policy, Reflections on the 
Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations After Seattle, 34(3) J. OF WORLD TRADE 22 
(2000); Joel P. Trachtman, Embedding mutual recognition at the WTO, 14 J. OF EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 780 (2007). 
25  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS], Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The 
Legal Texts: The results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 
(1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
26  J. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining around the TRIPS agreement: the case for 
ongoing public-private initiatives to facilitate worldwide intellectual property transactions, 9 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 21 (1998). 
27  WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on Dec. 13, 1996, 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, paras. 20-22. 
28  P. Drahos, Doing Deals with Al Capone: Paying Protection Money for Intellectual 
Property in the Global Knowledge Economy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH 146 (P. Yu ed., 2007). 
Araujo_Article_28Format_1_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 02/05/2017  11:35 AM 
110 21 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. NN (2017) 
perceived as undermining their ability to pursue developmental goals, but 
also as an unwanted distraction from the development agenda.29 
B. Contesting Multilateral Trade Governance 
The inability of proponents of deep integration to achieve their agenda 
in the context of multilateral trade negotiations has led them to pursue such 
objectives in other fora.  This has led to a fragmented international trading 
system where rule-making increasingly occurs outside of the WTO.  
Scholars Julia Morse and Robert Keohane recently devised “contested 
multilateralism” as a conceptual framework to explain the global trend away 
from unitary international legal regimes and towards fragmented and diffuse 
regimes.30  This concept relates to the practice of using different 
international institutions to “challenge the rules and practices, or missions of 
existing multilateral institutions.”31  The framework posits that where 
coalitions are dissatisfied with the operation of a particular multilateral 
regime, actors may challenge it by shifting the focus of rule-making to 
different institutions.  The causes of dissatisfaction can be varied, ranging 
from issues relating to the organizational structure of the contested regime to 
concerns about its rules, practices, and goals. 
The current contestation of the existing multilateral trade system can be 
attributed to a number of factors that together have led to the current 
paralysis affecting the WTO.  The first factor is the diffusion of power in 
international relations, which is the result of a shift from a unipolar to a 
multipolar world.  The WTO itself was the result of a unique set of 
circumstances, namely the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting collapse 
of an ideological counterpoint to the US-backed free market doctrine that 
allowed the latter, flanked by the European Union, to push through the 
establishment of a truly multilateral trading system.32  However, the 
subsequent rise of large emerging economies, in particular the powerful 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), has caused a fundamental 
change in the dynamics of international trade relations — insofar as these 
                                               
29  Gallagher, supra note 4, at 62-85 
30  Julia Morse & Robert Keohane, Contested Multillateralism, 9(4) REV. OF INT’L ORG. 
385 (2014). 
31  Id. at 387. 
32  Silvya Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for future 
negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 299-300 (D. Kennedy & J. Southwick eds., 2002); JOHN BARTON ET AL., 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND 
THE WTO 3 (2008). 
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can no longer be delivered by a duopoly of the European Union and the 
United States33 and must accommodate a diverse group of interests and 
nation-states.34  The impact of this diffusion of power on multilateralism can 
be seen in the failure of the Doha Round negotiations, where developing 
countries, led by emerging economies such as India, Brazil, and China, 
demonstrated their capability both to withstand pressures exerted by the 
United States and the European Union and to mobilize developing country 
opposition.35 
The fall of multilateralism’s stock in the international trading order is 
also a reflection of the difficulties resulting from the incorporation of 
regulatory disciplines. As the classic understanding of what constitutes trade 
is extended beyond the mere cross-border movement of goods to include 
new areas that impinge on domestic regulatory sovereignty, multilateral 
negotiations become ever-more-complex affairs. This is especially so 
because during the Uruguay Round, GATT members agreed to adopt the 
“single undertaking” provision, which required all parties to adopt all 
agreements as a package.36  In other words, WTO negotiations are 
underpinned by an “all or nothing” rationale, which precludes the possibility 
of cherry-picking.  This approach proved problematic in the Doha Round 
wherein disagreements concerning the expansion of global trade rules led to 
the outright exclusion of many proposals from the negotiating table.  
Developing countries, already disappointed by the unbalanced outcome of 
the Uruguay Round,37 were never likely to embrace the regulatory 
disciplines proposed by developed countries (e.g., Singapore Issues), and 
used the single undertaking to exclude them from negotiations. 
The outcome of contested multilateralism will vary from one case to 
another.  If the regime in question is unable to adapt and meet the demands 
of the dissatisfied actors, the latter can challenge it by switching their custom 
                                               
33  Zaki Laidi, How Trade Became Geopolitics, 25(2) WORLD POL’Y J. 56 (2008). 
34  Debra Steger, The Culture of the WTO: Why it Needs to Change?, 10(3) J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 493, 493 (2007); Kenneth Heydon & Stephen Woolcock, The Evolution of the International 
Trading System, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 
53 (2013). 
35  John Peterson & Alasdair Young, The EU and the New Trade Politics, 13(6) J. EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y 797, 797 (2006). 
36  Brian Hindley, What Subjects are Suitable for WTO Agreements?, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 159 (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 
2006). 
37  Joseph M. Finger, Developing Countries in the WTO System: Applying Robert Hudec’s 
Analysis to the Doha Round, 31(7) THE WORLD ECONOMY 887, 895-98 (2008); Cho, supra 
note 2, at 577-78.  
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to: (1) an already existing forum (regime shifting), or (2) a new regime that 
more accurately reflects their interests and/or is designed to influence the 
rules and goals of the contested multilateral regime (competitive regime 
creation).38  In certain cases, strategic inconsistency (that is, the 
incompatibility of the regimes) will lead the contested regime to modify its 
practices and rules to accommodate the demands of the contesting coalitions; 
in other cases, the authority of the contested institutions will be undermined 
to such an extent that the competing institutions become the dominant 
regime.39  However, Morse and Keohane find that, more often than not, the 
end result of contested multilateralism is the creation of regime complexes 
rather than the establishment of an integrated regime.40  Such international 
regime complexes are said to exist where a specific subject area is governed 
by multiple international legal regimes that functionally overlap but have no 
hierarchy of rules to solve conflicts between such rules.41  As explained by 
Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier, the emergence of complex and fragmented 
legal systems typically leads to the exercise of “chessboard politics” insofar 
as the availability of multiple fora provides international actors various 
options to pursue their varied interests in a specific policy area.42  One such 
option is forum shopping, which allows international actors to pick and 
choose the legal regime that best suits their interests. 
Complexity in global governance also creates winners and losers.  In 
this respect, Daniel Drezner notes that a key attribute of multilateral rule-
based orders is that, by creating common constraints that apply to all states, 
they can “shift arenas of international relations from power-based outcomes 
to rule-based outcomes.”43  Regime complexes, however, generate an 
environment conducive to power-based politics, as major powers are better 
placed to successfully implement the strategies (or “chessboard politics”) 
that lead to the contestation of multilateral institutions.  This advantage is 
manifested in a number of ways.  First, the availability of different fora 
                                               
38  Bart Kerremans, What Went Wrong in Cancun? A Principal-Agent View on the EU’s 
Rationale Towards the Doha Development Round, 9(3) EURO. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 363, 372-73 
(2004); see also supra note 4. 
39  Morse, supra note 30, at 409. 
40  Id. 
41  Kal Raustiala & David Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 
INT’L ORG., 279 (2008). 
42  Karen Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7(1) 
PERSP. ON POL. 13, 13-16 (2009). 
43  Daniel Drezner, The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP. ON 
POL. 65, 65-66 (2009).  
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increases the bargaining power of major powers because they can easily 
withdraw support from institutions that do not suit their agendas.44  This 
allows them to either force an agenda in a multilateral setting or shift the 
discussion to other fora.  Second, by weakening existing rules-based 
systems, regime complexes reduce the legal constraints applicable to 
powerful states.45  Third, more powerful states have greater resources and 
expertise to navigate the foggy world of fragmented legal systems, often 
leaving smaller states marginalized from the rule-making process.46 
Forum shifting has generally been the instrument of choice for those 
seeking to contest the WTO.47  As the likelihood of negotiating regulatory 
disciplines within the remit of the WTO has receded further into the 
distance, demanders of deep integration have increasingly resorted to 
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements to achieve their trade 
policy objectives.  There are two legal avenues available for WTO Members 
who wish to pursue trade agreements outside the auspices of WTO law.  The 
first option is to pursue “variable geometry” by negotiating—in accordance 
with Article X:9 of the WTO Agreement—a plurilateral agreement whose 
benefits may not be applied multilaterally but rather only to the participants 
to the agreement.  Examples of such agreements are the WTO Agreement on 
Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on Government Procurement.  Such 
agreements remove the issue of free-riding, as Article X:9 permits 
discrimination while leaving the door open for WTO Members to accede, 
and allowing the members of the plurilateral agreement to benefit from the 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.  However, WTO Members wishing 
to follow this path face a considerable obstacle in the shape of Article X:9 of 
the WTO agreement that requires a consensus decision approving non-MFN 
plurilateral agreements.48  In other words, every single WTO Member has 
the power to veto the creation of a discriminatory plurilateral agreement 
                                               
44  Id. at 67. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  See Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional 
Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130-160 (2005).  
48  Claus-Dieter Ehlerman & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade 
Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for 
Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade?, 8(1) J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 
51, 51-75 (2005); Hunter Nottage & Thomas Sebastian, Giving Legal Effect to the Results of 
WTO Trade Negotiations: An Analysis of the Methods of Changing WTO Law, 9(4) J. OF 
INT’L ECON. L. 989, 989-1016 (2006); Bernard Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO ‘à la 
carte’ or ‘menu du jour’? Assessing the Case for More Plurilateral Agreements, 26 EUR. J. OF 
INT’L L. 319 (2015). 
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within the WTO framework. 
In light of the known objections to the introduction of new issues within 
WTO law by developing and emerging economies, this consensus 
requirement has effectively ruled out the prospect of negotiating plurilateral 
agreements under WTO law.  As a result, WTO Members wishing to go it 
alone usually have little option but to plump for the second option: the 
negotiation of a PTA (whether bilateral, regional or plurilateral) in 
accordance with Article XXIV of GATT 1947 and V of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).49  Like plurilateral agreements 
concluded under Article X:9, PTAs address concerns regarding free-riding 
by giving parties the right to decide not to extend the commitments included 
in such agreements on a MFN basis.  PTAs had already become ubiquitous 
in the world trading system by the time the Uruguay Round negotiations 
were initiated.  In fact, the United States had paved the way towards their 
successful completion by concluding a number of bilateral trade agreements 
in advance, which secured liberalization reforms and created a groundswell 
of support for the imminent multilateral trade liberalization.50  The United 
States was the first to make the jump away from multilateralism towards 
bilateralism.  This move was embodied by the US policy of “competitive 
liberalization,” which favored the negotiation of bilateral PTAs.51  One of 
the underlying rationales behind this policy was that the United States could 
use its higher bargaining power in the context of bilateral PTA negotiations 
to push through a US-style approach to economic liberalization52  The term 
“competitive” reflected two fundamental aspects of the policy.  First, the 
United States was competing against other major trading powers also 
engaged in bilateral trade negotiations and was seeking to re-establish its 
leadership in the international trading system; the more PTAs the United 
States signed, the more support would be gathered for its positions at the 
WTO level.53  Second, trading partners would have to compete against each 
                                               
49  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867, 
U.N.T.S. 154. 
50  Brian Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 218 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 
2006). 
51  Alvin Hilaire & Yongzheng Yang, The United States and the New 
Regionalism/Bilateralism, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 603 (2005). 
52  Alberta Sbragia, The EU, the US and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence in the 
Management of Globalization 17(3) J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 368, 376-377 (2010). 
53  Simon J. Evenett & Michael Meier, An Interim Assessment of the U.S. Trade Policy of 
“Competitive Liberalization,” Discussion Paper no. 2007-18, UNIVERSITAT ST. GALLEN, 1 
(2007). 
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other to gain access to the US market.  Indeed, the US approach to 
competitive liberalization was that the United States would only negotiate 
with countries that were willing to make substantial market opening 
concessions.  By making it clear that those countries that were not willing to 
play by the rules would be left behind, the United States sought to further 
increase its leverage in negotiations.54 
The US policy of competitive liberalization acted as a trigger for other 
economic powers to follow suit.  For example, once it became clear that the 
Doha Round was faltering, and in a bid to make up ground lost to the United 
States, the European Union was forced to reconsider its approach towards 
the negotiation of PTAs.  The shift in policy was crystallized in the 2006 
Global Europe strategy, which outlined a new EU strategy with regard to its 
trade agreements.55  The policy notes that while the European Union has 
focused on the Doha Round, its “main trading partners and priority targets 
have been negotiating PTAs with [the EU’s] competitors”56 and bemoans the 
fact that “[t]he current geography of FTAs mainly covers our geography and 
development objectives well but our trade interests less well.”57  Therefore, 
much like the competitive liberalization policy of the United States, the 
European Union seeks to enhance its position in comparison to its 
competitors.  The Global Europe strategy is also similar to US competitive 
liberalization in terms of the ambitious levels of harmonization being 
pursued, as it clearly maintains the European Union’s focus on deeper 
integration.  The EU position is that, in the absence of any real progress in 
the Doha Round negotiations, they should look to enter into PTAs promoting 
“deep integration,”58 which it defines as “WTO-plus in terms of width and 
depth.”  Recent studies of PTAs concluded by both the European Union and 
the United States confirm that they typically include the new deep 
disciplines that were rejected in the Doha Round.59  These bilateral PTAs are 
used to expand the regulatory standards favored by these two trade powers 
and, in doing so, incrementally ratchet up the regulatory standards of the 
                                               
54  Id. at 20. 
55  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GLOBAL EUROPE COMPETING IN THE WORLD: A CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE EU’S GROWTH AND JOBS STRATEGY 567 (2006). 
56  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ANNEX TO COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 1, 14 (2006). 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 19. 
59  HENRIK HORN, PETROS MAVROIDIS, & ANDRE SAPIR, BEYOND THE WTO? AN ANATOMY 
OF EU AND US PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 53 (2009). 
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international trading system.60 
More recently, the European Union and the United States have upped 
the ante by pursuing larger trade deals such as plurilateral PTAs and so-
called mega-regional PTAs.  Recent plurilateral PTAs have been global in 
scope, insofar as membership is not limited to a particular geographic region 
and as they have been used by the European Union and the United States to 
secure economic integration and liberalization goals that could not be 
attained at the WTO level in specific areas.  The two most notable examples 
are the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)61 and the Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA).62  In both instances, the decision to negotiate 
these agreements was driven by the frustration emanating from their 
proponents’ repeated failure to increase liberalization commitments and 
standards at the WTO level. 
The ACTA arose as a response to multiple failed attempts by the United 
States and Japan to increase the minimum standards of intellectual property 
(IP) protection enforcement under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of interllectual Property (TRIPS63).  The agreement—which 
includes rules on civil and criminal enforcement, customs control 
procedures, and digital copyright infringement—was therefore negotiated 
mostly by advanced industrialized nations that have historically supported 
calls for higher standards of IP protection in TRIPS.  However, ACTA was a 
hugely controversial endeavor from its inception, and was the subject of 
heavy criticism focusing on the lack of transparency of negotiations and the 
potential of the agreement to undermine fundamental human rights.64  
Although an agreement was signed in 2011, following the refusal of the 
European Parliament to ratify it, only one participant has ratified it to date, 
                                               
60  Simmons, supra note 11, at 445. 
61  Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, 
the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America, COM 
(2011) 380 final (June 24, 2011). 
62  European Commission Memo/13/107, Negotiations for a Plurilateral Agreement on 
Trade in Services (Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter EU Memo]. 
63  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
64  Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights by Diminishing Privacy: 
How the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Jeopardizes the Right to Privacy, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 600, 601-636 (2011). 
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and the agreement is now largely considered to no longer be viable.65 
The idea of a plurilateral trade in services agreement (TiSA) was first 
mooted by the United States and Australia in 2011 in response to the 
inability to pursue negotiations on services in the context of the Doha 
Round.66  The objective was to gather like-minded WTO Members (so-
called “Really Good Friends” or “RGFs”67) keen to push forward 
negotiations on trade in services in order to develop a trade agreement 
outside the auspices of the GATS with the aim of addressing its 
deficiencies.68  This plurilateral agreement would not only further existing 
market access commitments but also address new service areas thus far 
untouched by GATS, lock in domestic liberalization policies, and establish 
additional regulatory disciplines.  Four years on, the group of RGFs has 
increased from 16 to 25 members, and while negotiations remain very much 
alive, they also remain very much a work in progress.  However, the ultimate 
goal pursued by the proponents of the TiSA could not be clearer.  As the 
European Union puts it, the objective of the TiSA is to “negotiate an 
ambitious agreement that is compatible with the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, (GATS), which would attract broad participation and that 
could be multi-lateralized at a later stage.”69 
Mega-regional PTAs differ from the above plurilateral PTAs both in 
terms of their geographic and substantive coverage.  First, mega-regional 
PTAs are closed agreements that are intended to secure economic integration 
between specific countries or regions that hold a significant share of global 
trade and investment.  Second, mega-regionals are not single-issue 
                                               
65  Duncan Matthews & Petra Zikovská, The Rise and Fall of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA): Lessons for the European Union, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 626 (2013). 
66  See Shin Yi Peng, Is the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) a Stepping Stone for the 
Next Version of GATS, 43 H.K. L. J. 611, 614 (2013); Juan A. Marchetti and Martin Roy, The 
TISA initiative: an overview of market access issues, 48(4) Journal of World Trade 683, 694 
(2014); Pierre Sauvé, Towards a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TISA): Challenges 
and prospects, 50(1) Journal of International Commerce, 1440006-1, 1440006-4 (2014). 
67  The coalition of Really Good Friends currently includes the following members: 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, European Union, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, and Uruguay.  
68  Pierre Sauvé, Directorate-General for External Policies, Workshop, The Plurilateral 
Agreement on Services, EUR. PARLIAMENT 14 (July 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/workshop/join/2013/433722/EXPO-
INTA_AT(2013)433722_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/R6DM-FAVq]. 
69  EU Memo, supra note 62. 
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agreements.  Instead, they generally follow the template set in bilateral PTAs 
in that they are comprehensive in their scope, both in terms of the breadth 
and depth of commitments and regulatory standards included.  A third and 
final distinction between plurilateral PTAs and mega-regional PTAs rests in 
their rationales.  Mega-regional PTAs are not solely fueled by the paralysis 
of the multilateral process and the desire to address the rise of global value 
chains.  These deals are viewed as tools not only to pursue economic 
interests but also to pursue important geopolitical concerns.  This is certainly 
the case of the recently-concluded Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade 
agreement that includes countries such as Australia, Canada, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Singapore, and Japan, and that was born out of the United States’ 
decision to pivot its foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region in order 
to counteract the growing influence of China.70 
For the United States, the TPP offered an opportunity to access the 
growing and lucrative Asia-Pacific market and to alter the power dynamics 
in Asia by displacing China as the central actor in economic governance in 
the region.  As is often the case in trade matters, where the United States 
goes, the European Union follows.  The negotiation of the TPP left the 
European Union in the unenviable position of being outside looking in on 
what could be not only one of the most lucrative trade arrangements in the 
world, but also—as the TPP sought to achieve deep liberalization—one that 
would set the template for future deep trade disciplines.  The European 
Union has recently launched PTA negotiations with Japan and the United 
States (TTIP) in order to mitigate the potential for the TPP to divert trade 
away from the European Union and to ensure that it also has a hand in 
setting the new disciplines of the international trading system.  In the context 
of these negotiations, the European Union has made it clear that dismantling 
non-tariff barriers is its primary objective.  With regard to the negotiations 
with Japan, the European Union has stated its intention to address disciplines 
in areas such as “services, investment, procurement, intellectual property 
rights and regulatory issues”71 and has demanded the harmonization of 
Japan’s notoriously sui generis technical, safety, and environmental 
                                               
70  Gabriel Feylbermayr & Rahel Aichele, How to make TTIP inclusive for all? Potential 
economic impacts of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on 
developing countries, IFO INST. 25-27 (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/How_to_make_TTIP_inclu
sive.pdf [http://perma.cc/YT7D-Z6NL]; Winters, supra note 7, at 10. 
71  Karel De Gucht, Challenge and Opportunity: Starting the negotiations for Free Trade 
Agreement between the EU and Japan, EUR. COMMISSION 1, 2 (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-256_en.htm [http://perma.cc/6Q7N-8Z9R]. 
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regulations with existing international standards.72 
Whether in the context of the TPP or the TTIP, the discourse adopted by 
the European Union and, until very recently, the United States clearly 
suggests that these agreements were about much more than bypassing the 
multilateral process and furthering trade liberalization.  Both saw the 
conclusion of these agreements as part of a race with emerging economies, 
particularly China, to define the future rules of international trade.73  In this 
light, the former United States Trade Representative, Michael Froman, stated 
that, through agreements such as the TPP, the United States intends to set the 
“economic rules of the road before others will”73 so that these rules reflect 
US economic interests and values.  Similarly, the European Union’s Trade 
Commissioner acknowledged that TTIP was about was  “who sets “global 
standards for the regulation of goods and services in the twenty-first 
century”74 TTIP sought to strengthen “the hand of Europe and America in 
that process”75, by consolidating “shared Atlantic values, from the 
fundamentals of democracy and the rule of law to key areas such as the 
environment and social standards.”76 
The shift by the European Union and the United States towards 
bilateralism, regionalism, and plurilateralism in the area of trade policy is an 
apt illustration of Drezner’s point that regime complexes generally favor 
powerful states.  The rules-based system of the WTO, based on decision-
making by consensus, empowered developing nations and allowed them to 
oppose reform proposals that did not address their concerns.  Faced with a 
brick wall, major economies have resorted to PTAs, which offer the path of 
least resistance.  Developed countries are able to use their higher bargaining 
power in PTA negotiations to impose the adoption of their own regulatory 
preferences and to progressively create a groundswell of support for their 
positions at the multilateral level.  In other words, the objective is to 
                                               
72  Cecilia Malmström, EU-Japan FTA: Crafting an Ambitious Deal, EUR. COMMISSION 3 
(May 29, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153488.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VTV2-X2ME].  
73 Glen S. Fukushima, The political economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: a US 
perspective, 28(4) JAPAN F. 549, 549 (2016).  
73  Michael Froman, If We Don’t Write The Rules Of The Global Economy, Others Will, GE 
REPORTS (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.gereports.com/amb-michael-froman-if-we-dont-write-
the-rules-of-the-global-economy-others-will/ [http://perma.cc/TC79-97GE].  
74  Cecilia Malmström & Jonathan Hill, Don’t believe the anti-TTIP hype – increasing 
trade is a no-brainer, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2015). 
75  Ibid 
76  Ibid. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/16/ttip-transatlantic-trade-
deal-businesses [http://perma.cc/ZM8D-ZL8C].  
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establish global rules by increments. 
II. SETTING THE RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM – 
WHAT’S ON THE MENU? 
A.  Competing Visions of the International Trading System 
As we have seen, both the European Union and the United States have 
recently affirmed their desire to set the rules of global commerce before 
others, notably BRICs, do it for them.  At one stage, it looked as though the 
United States in particular was pulling ahead of its competitors by 
successfully completing the negotiations on the TPP.  Should a finalized 
TTIP be added to the mix, the United States could reasonably claim to have 
set the rules of the road for economic governance in three major economic 
blocs (the Americas, Europe, and Asia Pacific).  However, any assumption 
that these rules would inevitably set global benchmarks has now been proven 
to be premature.  First, it seems unlikely that either the TPP or the TTIP will 
be ratified.  For all the zeal of the European Union and United States in 
pushing through these agreements, their domestic constituents remain far 
from convinced about the supposed benefits of these trade deals.  The 
concerns that were previously expressed in relation to the WTO regarding 
the loss of policy autonomy and the lowering of social, environmental, and 
consumer protection standards are now being levelled at mega-PTAs.77  The 
recent presidential election in the United States, in which both candidates 
adopted a clear anti-trade rhetoric, has thrown these concerns into sharp 
relief.  The eventual winner of the election, Donald Trump, routinely linked 
free trade and trade agreements with the loss of manufacturing jobs–a 
message that played very well with a significant portion of the US 
electorate–and vowed to radically change the United States’ approach to 
negotiating trade agreements.  Indeed, one of Donald Trump’s main 
campaign pledges was to not ratify the TPP, which was portrayed as “a 
                                               
77  FERDI DE VILLE & GABRIEL SILES-BRÜGGE, TTIP: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (2015); Alasdair Young, Not your 
parents’ trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, 
23(3) REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 345  (2016); S. Donnan, And Now the Other TPP Battle Begins, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/69f94d26-6af5-11e5-8171-
ba1968cf791a [http://perma.cc/TR2J-BXPF); The Trans-Pacific Partnership – Weighing 
Anchor, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21672330-negotiators-agree-ambitious-trade-deal-opposition-its-ratification 
[http://perma.cc/U8R5-28Ja]. 
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potential disaster”78 that would lead to job losses in the United States.  On 
January 23, President Trump made good on his promise by signing an 
executive order formally ending the United States’ participation in the 
TPP.79  Second, even if the TTP and the TTIP were to eventually be signed 
by the United States, it is unclear whether agreements that do not include 
any of the BRIC countries in their membership can truly be seen as an event 
that could jumpstart WTO negotiations.80  The absence from the TPP of 
India, one of Asia’s economic powerhouses and one of the ringleaders in the 
opposition against WTO reforms proposed by the European Union and the 
United States in the Doha Round, is very significant in this respect in that it 
runs counter to the notion that the agreement will come to define the rules of 
trade in the Asia-Pacific region.  Indeed, China’s response to the TPP was to 
spearhead efforts to conclude its very own mega-PTA in Asia, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which would overshadow 
the TPP in terms of membership numbers by including all Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, as well as Japan, South Korea, 
India, Australia, and New Zealand.  Early indications suggest that this 
agreement, should it be completed, would replicate the Chinese approach to 
negotiating PTAs, which, as will be seen, focuses essentially on tariff 
                                               
78  Nicky Woolf, Justin McCurry & Benjamin Haas, Trump to withdraw from Trans-Pacific 
Partnership on first day in office, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/donald-trump-100-days-plans-video-
trans-pacific-partnership-withdraw [http://perma.cc/AR3Q-PATQ]. 
79  See Y. Mui, President Trump Signs Order to Withdraw from Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/23/president-trump-signs-order-to-
withdraw-from-transpacific-partnership/?utm_term=.1439d7fde412 [https://perma.cc/X4AJ-
GNAT].   
It should be noted that the United States’s refusal to sign the Trans-Pacific Partnetship (TPP) 
will not necessarily spell the end of the agreement, as Australia and Japan have recently 
signaled their intention to pursue its ratification. See Konrad Yakabuski, Why Japan is hell-
bent on saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Dec. 23 2016), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/why-japan-is-hell-
bent-on-saving-the-tpp/article33413016/ [http://perma.cc/GE6K-GRSW]; Harry Pearl, Japan, 
Australia to strengthen defense ties, stress importance of TPP, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2017), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-australia-japan-security-idUKKBN14Y0AL 
[http://perma.cc/GRQ2-WZXD]. 
80  Ann Capling & John Ravenhill, The TPP: multilateralizing regionalism or the 
securitization of trade policy, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT 274, 279 (C. Lim, D. Elms & P. Low eds., Cambridge 
University Press 2012). 
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reductions rather than non-tariff barriers and regulatory divergence.81  This 
would raise questions about the idea that the United States (and the 
European Union) are pulling others along and suggest that rather than 
ensuring that their regulatory preferences are seen as global rules and 
standards, mega-PTAs are merely consolidating the fragmentation of the 
international trading system.  And, of course, a US decision to definitely pull 
away from the TPP would arguably cement China’s position of leadership in 
the Asia-Pacific region and strengthen its role as a rule-maker in the global 
trading system.82  In short, the idea that the mega-PTAs backed by the 
European Union and the United States will provide a basis for a new 
multilateral trade regime should not be taken for granted. 
The following Subsections examine the types of regulatory disciplines 
generally included in PTAs concluded by the European Union and the 
United States on the one hand, and emerging economies (with a particular 
focus on China) on the other hand. 
B. The EU and U.S. Model for Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements 
1. Exporting Regulatory Preferences 
To the extent that bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade deals have 
been pursued in large part to address the Doha Round stalemate, it should 
come as no surprise that the vast majority of these agreements have included 
provisions enhancing liberalization commitments and regulating issues that 
were rejected during WTO negotiations.  Barring a few exceptions, there is 
broad agreement that these PTAs either include WTO plus rules (that is, 
obligations that go beyond what is currently provided under WTO law) or 
WTO-X rules (obligations relating to topics currently not covered by WTO 
law).83  The European Union and the United States, in particular, have 
consistently negotiated deep PTAs that reflect their own regulatory 
preferences, from high standards of intellectual property protection to the 
promotion of regulatory frameworks that support transparent and 
                                               
81  Jack Kim, China-backed trade pact playing catch-up after U.S.-led TPP deal, REUTERS 
(Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-rcep-idUSKCN0S500220151011 
[http://perma.cc/EMA7-CTWU]. 
82  See Byung-Il Choi, Whither the TPP? Political Economy of Ratification and Effect on 
Trade Architecture in East Asia, 20(3) EAST ASIAN ECON. REV. 311, 323 (2016); Douglas 
Irwin, The truth about trade: What critics get wrong about the global economy, FOREIGN AFF. 
(2016); Fukushima, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 552. 
83  HORN, MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note 59. 
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competitive business environments.84 
The manner in which such WTO-plus and WTO-X agendas are pursued 
in PTAs varies significantly from one agreement to another, depending on 
the identity of the parties and the subject matter at hand.  In some cases, 
PTAs are used to disseminate plurilateral rules agreed upon within the 
framework of the WTO.  This is the case with respect to the 
telecommunications sector where the WTO has developed the Reference 
Paper on Telecommunications Services (the Reference Paper),85 a GATS 
instrument that includes a number of regulatory principles that go beyond 
non-discriminatory concerns.86  It includes requirements concerning the 
adoption of anti-competitive safeguards87 and transparent procedures for the 
granting of licenses,88 as well as the establishment and maintenance of 
independent regulatory authorities.89  It also recognizes the right of WTO 
Members to adopt universal service obligations90 and imposes minimum 
standards regarding interconnection in order to ensure that new entrants to 
domestic telecommunications markets are able to access existing 
infrastructure networks.91 
The Reference Paper promotes a regulatory framework for 
telecommunications services based on principles of openness and 
competition, and reflects in particular the experiences of developed nations 
in liberalizing the telecommunications sector in the final two decades of the 
                                               
84  See Pascal Lamy, Stepping stones or stumbling blocks? The EU’s approach towards the 
problem of multilateralism vs regionalism in trade policy, 25(10) THE WORLD ECON. 1399 
(2002); Razeen Sally, Free trade agreements and the prospects for regional integration in 
East Asia, 1(2) ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 306 (2006); Cintia Quiliconi & Carol Wise, The US 
as a Bilateral Player: The Impetus for Asymmetric Free Trade Agreements, in COMPETITIVE 
REGIONALISM: FTA DIFFUSION IN THE PACIFIC RIM 97-117 (Mireya Solis, Barbara Stallings, & 
Saori n. Katada eds., 2009); BILLY A. MELO ARAUJO, THE EU DEEP TRADE AGENDA – LAW 
AND POLICY (2016). 
85  Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Reference Paper on 
Telecommunications Services, WTO (Apr. 24, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 367 [hereinafter Reference 
Paper]. 
86  Billy Melo Araujo, Regulating Services through Trade Agreements-A Comparative 
Analysis of Regulatory Disciplines Included in EU and US Free Trade Agreements, 6 TRADE 
L. & DEV. 392, 393 (2014). 
87  Reference Paper, supra note 84, at para. 1. 
88  Id. at para. 2(4). 
89  Id. at para. 5. 
90  Id. at para. 3. 
91  Id. at para. 2. 
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twentieth century.92  However, the impact of the Reference Paper is lessened 
by the fact that it is a plurilateral instrument and that the regulatory 
disciplines included therein only bind WTO Members to the extent that they 
are included as part of their scheduled commitments.  Both EU and US 
PTAs have tended to include regulatory disciplines on telecommunications 
services that are largely based on the GATS Reference Paper on 
Telecommunications.93  The same practice is found in the area of public 
procurement.  Faced with stiff opposition, proponents of public procurement 
liberalization at the WTO level have resorted to signing plurilateral 
procurement-related agreements, first under the auspices of GATT 1947 and 
then under that of the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).  
The successive versions of the GPA—the latest of which was signed in 
2011—go beyond the mere requirement of non-discrimination by providing 
an over-arching regulatory framework for public procurement that covers the 
principal aspects of the procurement bidding process and the enforcement of 
procurement rules.  Again, both EU and US PTAs include language taken 
from the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement.94  By 
requiring their trading partners to sign on to these rules, the European Union 
and the United States hope to incrementally increase support for plurilateral 
WTO instruments and pave the way for their future multilateralization. 
In the absence of WTO-sanctioned plurilateral rules, proponents of 
PTAs can pursue other avenues to advance their regulatory preferences.  One 
such option is to use PTAs to promote international rules concluded outside 
of the framework of the WTO.  In the area of intellectual property, for 
example, the EU and the US PTAs have historically tended to require parties 
to sign on to and comply with various agreements concluded under the 
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization, which impose 
requirements that go beyond TRIPS.95  In the same vein, PTAs regulating 
                                               
92  Andrew Lang, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 285 (2011). 
93  B. Melo Araujo, Regulating Services Through Trade Agreements, supra note 85, at 408-
09. 
94  B. Melo Araujo, The EU’s Deep Trade Agenda: Stumbling Block or Stepping Stone 
Towards Multilateral Liberalisation?, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 280-81 (Christoph Hermann, Markus Karjewski, & Jorg Philipp Terhechte eds., 2013). 
95  Meir P. Pugatch, The international regulation of IPRs in a TRIPs and TRIPs-plus world, 
in TRADE AND INVESTMENT RULE-MAKING: THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND BILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 177, 187-88 (S Woolcock ed., 2006); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS was never enough: 
vertical forum shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 448 (2010); B. Melo 
Araujo, Intellectual Property and the EU’s Deep Trade Agenda 16(2) J. INT’L ECON. L. 439 
(2013). 
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labor and environmental issues will usually require compliance with various 
International Labor Organization conventions and multilateral environmental 
agreements.96  In the area of technical standards, recent PTAs, like the 
CETA, the EU-Korea FTA, and the Canada-Korea FTA, have also included 
provisions mandating regulatory approximation in line with existing 
international standards issued by the International Organization for 
Standardization and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe.97 
Where international rules do not exist or where such international rules 
are not deemed to reflect the offensive interests of the proponents of the 
PTAs, the latter have also included provisions replicating standards required 
under their own domestic laws.  This is evidenced by PTA practice in areas 
such as competition law and intellectual property rights regulation.  In the 
area of competition law, the European Union had in 1996 proposed the 
negotiation of a multilateral agreement on competition under the auspices of 
the WTO.98  Since it became clear that there was no appetite within the 
WTO membership for such an agreement, the European Union has since 
systematically included competition law chapters in its PTAs that not only 
require parties to adopt and maintain domestic competition laws, but also 
replicate the three basic prohibitions on private restraints addressed by EU 
competition law: anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices, 
abuses of dominant position between one or more enterprises, and mergers 
that significantly impede effective competition.99  With respect to 
intellectual property, the United States has long adopted the practice of 
including provisions in its PTAs that require signatories to implement 
domestic intellectual property regulatory systems in line with the standards 
ensured under US law.100  Similarly, the European Union is increasingly 
including provisions in its PTAs that either replicate the content of, or go 
                                               
96  Roman Grynberg & Veniana Quelo, Labour standards in US and EU preferential 
trading arrangements 40(4) J. WORLD TRADE 619 (2006); Lorre Van den Putte, Involving civil 
society in the implementation of social provisions in trade agreements: comparing the US and 
EU approach in the case of South Korea, 6(2) GLOBAL LAB. J. 221 (2015). 
97   Boris Rigod, TBT-Plus Rules in Preferential Trade Agreements, 40(3) LEGAL ISSUES OF 
ECON. INTEGRATION 247 (2013); Araujo, The EU’s Deep Trade Agenda, supra note 93, at 
278. 
98  Anestis Papadopoulos, “The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and 
Policy” (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 225. 
99  Araujo, The EU’s Deep Trade Agenda, supra note 93, at 280. 
100  Pugatch, supra note 94.  
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beyond what is currently provided under EU law.101 
A defining feature of EU and US policies for using PTAs to disseminate 
rules is that each agreement is used to incrementally ratchet up regulatory 
standards.  The general pattern is that each new PTA will consolidate the 
regulatory disciplines recognized by the PTAs that preceded it and, if 
possible, raise the bar further.  The ratcheting-up process has been amply 
demonstrated in the context of intellectual property.  Brian Mercurio 
describes it as a “never-ending cycle of multilateral standard setting which 
leads to increased standards via bilateralism/regionalism followed by 
consolidation in the form of more multilateralism.”102  Susan Sell has also 
demonstrated how the United States has made use of bilateral PTAs, ACTA, 
and the TPP to sequentially impose ever-increasing standards of intellectual 
property protection.103  The process is also evident in other regulatory areas.  
For instance, in the area of investment, the United States has developed 
model provisions for bilateral investment treaties (US Model BIT), which 
have been successfully spread through an extensive network of bilateral 
investment treaties and have served as a source of inspiration for multiple 
international investment agreements.104  In addition, the United States is 
now using mega-regionals to negotiate new standards of investment 
protection.  In this respect, a recent study showed that, barring a few notable 
exceptions, the investment protection chapter included in the TPP is 
fundamentally based on the text of the US Model BIT.105 
Finally, with respect to services, we have seen how both the European 
Union and the United States use PTAs to spread the reach of plurilateral 
WTO disciplines on telecommunications services.  However, these PTAs go 
beyond these plurilateral WTO rules by: (1) including additional regulatory 
disciplines that are not found in WTO instruments (e.g., procedural 
guarantees, transparency, data protection requirements, rules on electronic 
                                               
101  Araujo, Intellectual Property, supra note 94, at 439-474. 
102  Brian Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 236 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 
2006). 
103  Susan K. Sell, TRIPS was never enough: vertical forum shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and 
TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2010). 
104  Nikos Lavranos, The New EU Investment Treaties: Convergence Towards the NAFTA 
Model as the New Plurilateral Model BIT text? (Mar. 29, 2013) (unpublished policy brief) 
(accessible at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241455).   
105  See Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? 
Empirically Situating the TPP in the Investment Treaty Universe (Ctr. for Trade Econ. 
Integration, Working Paper No. IHEIDCTEI2015-08, 2015).  
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communications, and services, etc.); and (2) applying similar regulatory 
disciplines to services sectors that are regulated at the WTO level (e.g., 
postal and courier services and tourism services).106  Finally, the TiSA is 
now being envisaged as an opportunity to disseminate the types of 
disciplines typically included in EU and US PTAs.  The European Union has 
already stated that it intends to include disciplines on issues such as 
“independence of regulators, fair authorization processes or non-
discriminatory access to [. . .] networks”107 in the context of services sectors 
such as telecommunications, financial services, or postal and courier 
services.  The agreement would seek to replicate the type of sector-specific 
disciplines typically found in the most recent EU and US PTAs and expand 
their application to other services sectors.108  This approach appears to be 
confirmed by the EU proposal for an annex on financial services, which 
follows the template set in its PTAs by copy-pasting large swathes of the 
Reference Paper and the Financial Services Understanding, with a few 
deviations and additions in certain areas (e.g., new financial services, 
transparency requirements, etc.).109  The objectives pursued by the TiSA are, 
therefore, not too dissimilar to those currently pursued by the European 
Union and the United States in their deep PTAs confirming the suspicion 
that these trade powers are simultaneously using bilateral and plurilateral 
initiatives to impose rules for which there is no consensus at the multilateral 
level. 
2. Disciplines Targeting Emerging Economies 
The foregoing Subsection highlighted how trade deals have been used to 
regulate issues that were rejected within the framework of WTO 
negotiations.  The new generation of trade deals is also putting forward rules 
on emerging trade topics that had not previously been discussed at the WTO 
level.  Some of these new regulatory issues are intended to address particular 
challenges raised by the practices of emerging economies, notably China, 
which are considered to provide such countries with an unfair competitive 
                                               
106  Araujo, Regulating Services Through Trade Agreements, supra note 85, at 409-10. 
107  European Commission, Memo: Negotiations for a Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in 
Services 2 (Feb. 15, 2013) (accessible at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
107_en.htm).  
108  See Pierre Sauvé, A Plurilateral Agenda for Services? Assessing the Case for a Trade 
in Services Agreement (Swiss Nat’l Ctr. of Competence in Research, Working Paper No. 
2013/29, 2013).  
109  See European Commission, Proposal for an Annex on Financial Services (accessible at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1133). 
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advantage. 
First, there is the highly contentious issue of exchange rate 
manipulation.  In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there has been an 
increasing disquiet on the part of the United States concerning the perceived 
propensity of certain countries in East Asia to devalue their currencies for 
protectionist purposes; by preventing national currencies from appreciating, 
governments are able to improve exports and inhibit imports.110  China has 
been identified as the main culprit, accused of systematically devaluing its 
currency to gain a competitive advantage in international trade and achieve a 
trade surplus.111  However, disciplining exchange rate manipulation is a 
delicate task, as monetary policy has been historically recognized as a matter 
within the exclusive remit of national sovereignty.  Furthermore, not all 
devaluations of exchange rates can be said to pursue protectionist goals.  In 
many cases, devaluations are a perfectly valid policy for the pursuit of 
legitimate macro-economic and development objectives.112  Consequently, 
attempts to regulate exchange rate manipulation have been limited.  At the 
WTO level, it is generally acknowledged that currency devaluations are 
unlikely to run afoul of WTO law.113  In the context of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), there is an obligation to “avoid manipulating 
exchange rates [. . .] in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage.”114  
However, the specification that only manipulations undertaken with the goal 
of gaining a competitive advantage are covered by this obligation means that 
it is necessary to demonstrate the protectionist intent underpinning such 
actions – something that is very difficult to achieve.115 
Given the composition of its membership, the TPP was seen as the 
perfect opportunity to address exchange rate manipulation.  However, 
because of the reluctance of TPP states to subject themselves to stringent 
                                               
110  See Paul F. Cwik, The New Neo‐ Mercantilism: Currency Manipulation as a Form Of 
Protectionism, 31(3) ECO. AFFAIRS 7 (2011). 
111  See Geoffrey Garrett, G2 in G20: China, the United States and the World After the 
Global Financial Crisis, 1(1) GLOBAL POL’Y 29 (2010); C. Fred Bergsten & Joseph E. 
Gagnon, Currency Manipulation, the US Economy and the Global Economic Order 5 
(Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB12-25, 2012). 
112  See Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, Currency Manipulation and World Trade, 9 
WORLD TRADE REV. 583, 585 (2010). 
113  See id. at 606-16. 
114  International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement art. 4, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended Mar. 3, 2011). 
115  See Michael Waibel, Retaliating Against Exchange-Rate Manipulation, VOX EU (Apr. 
16, 2010), http://voxeu.org/article/retaliating-against-exchange-rate-manipulation-under-wto-
rules [https://perma.cc/FJN9-Z7UL]. 
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rules on monetary policy, the best that could be achieved was a side 
agreement between the treasury departments of TPP parties to “refrain from 
competitive devaluation and [to] not target [the] country’s exchange rate for 
competitive purposes.”116  This provision is limited on two fronts.  First, it 
maintains the same subjective element found under IMF rules whereby 
devaluations are only prohibited if it can be established that they were 
designed to provide a competitive advantage.  Second, although the 
provision is phrased in legally binding language, it lacks a mechanism of 
enforcement: the side agreement is not subject to the dispute settlement 
mechanism established under the TPP, and no mention is made of any 
sanctions that could be applied if a party is found to manipulate its currency 
for protectionist purposes.  Nevertheless, the agreement also includes 
extensive disclosure obligations that should enable the parties to monitor 
each other’s monetary policies and the impact of such policies on trade, and 
will therefore serve as a disincentive for parties to engage in currency 
manipulation.117 
An additional issue coming increasingly to the foreground of 
international trade politics is the regulation of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).  Of particular concern is China’s state-owned sector, which has 
historically benefited from government assistance and practices that are 
designed to provide them with a competitive advantage in global trade.118  In 
recent years, a number of challenges have been brought before the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism against China for such practices.  WTO 
litigation has centered on the granting of preferential treatment in violation 
of national treatment obligations under GATT or GATS and subsidies that 
violate the obligations under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures.  However, there are other means employed by countries to ensure 
that SOEs have a competitive advantage compared to private enterprises, 
such as government practices that turn a blind eye to the anti-competitive 
behavior of SOEs.119 
To try to address some of these issues, certain deep PTAs have 
                                               
116  Joint Declaration of the Macroeconomic Authorities of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Countries, ¶ I, Nov. 5, 2015 (accessible at 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/TPP_Currency_November%202015.pdf). 
117  Id. at ¶ II. 
118  See generally Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs)-A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 7(4) J. INT’L ECON. L. 863 
(2004). 
119  See Ming Du, China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law, 63(2) INT’L & COMP. L. 
Q. 409, 421-426 (2014). 
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tentatively sought to impose disciplines on SOEs.  For example, the EU-
Korea FTA includes provisions prohibiting the parties from adopting 
measures with respect to public enterprises that violate non-discrimination 
obligations, and requiring that public enterprises be subject to competition 
laws.120  Similarly, US PTAs typically prohibit SOEs from acting in a 
manner inconsistent with the obligations of the parties under the agreement 
and ensure non-discriminatory treatment in the sale of goods and services.121  
The TPP, however, goes further by including a 36-page chapter that imposes 
rules on SOEs ranging from the usual non-discrimination requirements (e.g., 
SOEs are required to sell products on a non-discriminatory basis and cannot 
enjoy preferential treatment from governments) to mandates that parties 
ensure that foreign SOEs do not benefit from jurisdictional immunity abroad 
and that designated monopolies do not engage in anti-competitive 
practices.122 
3.  Regulatory Cooperation 
Another emerging trend in more recent PTAs is the incorporation of the 
type of soft-law mechanisms that are increasingly prevalent in global 
economic governance.123  The complexities of the various areas of economic 
regulation, the oft-detailed nature of the issues covered, and the cultural 
sensitivities attached to regulation mean that traditional forms of 
international cooperation based on state-led diplomatic negotiations and 
judicial dispute settlement mechanisms are being complemented by less 
formal, process-based methods of international cooperation.124  International 
                                               
120  Free Trade Agreement, E.U.-S. Kor., arts. 11.4-11.5, Oct. 6, 2010 (accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/).  
121  Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., arts. 16.3-16.4, May 6, 2003 (accessible at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_403
6.pdf).  
122  Trans-Pacific Partnership chap. 17, Feb. 4, 2016 (accessible at https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text).  
123  Id.; John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law 
in Sustainable Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARIST STANDARDS 
IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. 
Trebilcock eds., 2004). 
124  Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global 
Government Networks, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 159 (2004); Sabino Cassese, Administrative 
Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
663 (2005); KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE, & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
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regulation is increasingly being conducted by “transnational systems of 
regulatory and administrative measures [. . .] established through 
international treaties and more informal networks of cooperation,” 125 
including specialized bodies and committees established by international 
organizations in order to administer and implement international agreements, 
transnational networks of national regulatory authorities, international 
standard-setting bodies, and hybrid public-private organizations.126  These 
developments are now being reflected in PTAs—especially those concluded 
by developed countries—that envisage the incorporation of administrative 
governance systems that are intended to promote regulatory dialogue and 
pave the way for the removal of regulatory divergences that hinder trade.127  
This is the case with the TTIP, which is due to include a horizontal 
cooperation chapter that would, inter alia, require parties to adopt good 
regulatory practices (e.g., publication of regulatory agendas and sharing of 
ex ante and ex post analyses), establish bodies that are specifically tasked 
with the duty of exchanging information on regulatory activity, and create 
cooperation frameworks to explore avenues towards mutual recognition or 
convergence.128  In addition, the TTIP envisages the creation of a Regulatory 
Cooperation Body (RCB) that would publish an annual report reflecting 
common priorities of the parties and the outcome of past regulatory 
cooperation activities, monitor implementation of the provisions of the 
regulatory cooperation chapter, consider new initiatives for regulatory 
cooperation, prepare joint initiatives for international regulatory instruments, 
and ensure transparency of regulatory cooperation between parties.  The 
RCB will likely be composed of senior officials and regulators who would 
work alongside ad hoc working-groups focusing on sector-specific 
                                               
OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 135 (2005). 
125  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005). 
126  Id. 
127  For an overview of regulatory cooperation mechanism included in preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) see Debra P. Steger, Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation in New 
Generation Economic and Trade Agreements, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 109 
(2012); Tracey Epps, Regulatory Cooperation and Free Trade Agreements, in TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AT THE CROSSROADS 141 (Susy Frankel & Meredith Kolsky Lewis eds., 2014). 
128  For in-depth analyses of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) regulatory cooperation chapter see Alberto Alemanno, The Regulatory Cooperation 
Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures and 
Democratic Consequences, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 625 (2015); Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto 
Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process 
Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2015). 
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regulatory issues.  The establishment of specialized bodies consisting of 
committees of experts meets the need for sector-specific regulation in areas 
such as chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices, car safety 
standards, and services.129 
A key aim of the regulatory cooperation mechanisms currently 
envisaged in the TTIP is to create a living agreement to address regulatory 
trade barriers on an ongoing basis.130  The parties intend to use the TTIP to 
explore possible areas of regulatory convergence and to address 
extraterritorial effects of regulation.  Broadly speaking, the institutional and 
cooperation frameworks established by the agreement should provide an 
environment for the development of mutual trust and long-term regulatory 
dialogue that is an essential prerequisite of regulatory convergence.131  More 
specifically, the TTIP will develop cooperation mechanisms in specific 
sectors to ensure that regulators address the extraterritorial effects of 
regulation adopted by both sides.  Others have also contended that the RCB 
could serve as a “transatlantic policy laboratory,” enabling parties to learn 
from each other’s regulatory divergences and experiences and to develop 
better regulatory approaches.132  This is consistent with the idea that 
regulatory cooperation between advanced economies is beneficial, not just 
because countries stand to gain more from the removal of regulatory 
barriers, but also because increased interaction between sophisticated 
regulatory systems can have a positive effect on regulatory outcomes.  The 
argument goes that, when faced with better regulatory processes, countries 
will be induced to “improve [their] own regulations in order to face the 
challenges raised by the partner’s better regulations.”133 
While the ambitions of regulatory cooperation mechanisms tend to be 
substantial, it must be noted that the reality rarely matches these grand 
ambitions.  History suggests that regulatory cooperation within the 
framework of PTAs is no easy task, even between countries sharing similar 
                                               
129  European Commission, TTIP and Regulation: An Overview (Feb. 10, 2015). 
130  Karel De Gucht, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Solving the 
Regulatory Puzzle, EUR. COMMISSION (Oct. 10, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-801_en.htm.  
131  Ioannis Lianos & Johannes Le Blanc, The ‘trust’ theory of integration, in REGULATING 
TRADE IN SERVICES IN THE EU AND THE WTO 15, 46-52 (Ioannis Lianos & Okeoghene Odudu 
eds., 2012). 
132  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 126, at 133. 
133  Patrick A. Messerlin, The Much Needed EU Pivoting to East Asia, 10 ASIA-PAC. J. EU 
STUD. 1, 5-6 (2012).  
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levels of economic development.134  The European Union and the United 
States have previously established regulatory cooperation frameworks with 
modest outcomes at best.135  Likewise, although proponents of the TPP 
originally intended to include numerous sector-specific regulatory 
cooperation mechanisms in the agreement, these plans were abandoned as a 
result of irreconcilable differences between the negotiating parties. 
C.  Emerging Economy PTAs – Maintaining the Status Quo 
The emerging economies that acted as leaders of the opposition against 
developed country reform proposals in the Doha Round have maintained 
their reluctance to embrace WTO-plus issues and deep integration in their 
PTAs.136  For example, Mercosur—the customs union to which Brazil 
belongs—has historically adopted a conservative stance towards free 
trade.137  Similarly, although India has signed a number of trade agreements, 
it is generally limited to market access issues in the area of goods and 
services sectors in which it holds offensive interests.138 
The conservatism of emerging market economies was evidenced by the 
European Union’s recent failed attempts to negotiate deep and 
comprehensive trade deals with these countries.  The European Union 
launched negotiations on a PTA with Mercosur back in 2010.  However, 
despite nine negotiation rounds, the parties have failed to make much 
headway as Mercosur remains unwilling to make substantial concessions in 
areas such as services, investment, procurement, and intellectual property.  
Likewise, the EU-India PTA negotiations launched in June 2007 have 
stuttered along with no seeming end in sight.  India’s long list of concerns 
include fears that the EU TRIPS-plus agenda may constrict its ability to 
manufacture and sell generic drugs and that the enactment of EU-inspired 
competition laws would undermine developmental objectives as well as 
                                               
134  Steger, supra note 125, at 125. 
135  See RAYMOND J. AHEARN, TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: BACKGROUND 
AND ANALYSIS 16-17 (2009). 
136  See Razeen Sally, The Political Economy of Trade Policy Reform: Lessons from 
Developing Countries, 2 J. INT’L TRADE & DIPL. 55, 84-85 (2008). 
137  Renato G. Flores, Jr., In Search of a Feasible EU-Mercosul Free Trade Agreement, 
CTR. EUR. POL’Y STUD. 3-4 (Feb. 25, 2013), 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/WD%20378%20Flores%20EU-Mercosul%20FTA.pdf. 
138  Idesbald Goddeeris & Kalyani Unkule, The European Union – India Free Trade 
Negotiations, in INDIA IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: POLITY, ECONOMY, and 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 231 (Jakub Zajczkowski, Jivanta Schottli, Manish Thapa 
eds., 2013).  
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objections to the liberalization of a government procurement market that 
accounts for a huge chunk of its national GDP.139 
China’s approach somewhat differs.  While it does not share the 
propensity of advanced industrialized nations towards deep integration, it 
has, since its accession to the WTO, increasingly made use of PTAs as a tool 
to expand its sphere of influence.140  Indeed, since its accession to the WTO, 
China has been very keen to “reshape” the rules of international trade in a 
manner that best reflects its interests.141  According to data provided by the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China has concluded fourteen PTAs with 
neighboring countries and Western European countries (Switzerland and 
Iceland).  China is also currently negotiating or exploring the possibility of 
negotiating twelve additional agreements, including two mega-regional 
PTAs: (1) a regional trade agreement with the ASEAN, and (2) a tripartite 
agreement with Japan and South Korea.142  The negotiation of such 
agreements is underpinned by various foreign policy objectives beyond the 
desire to boost trade.  For example, PTAs concluded with ASEAN countries 
were intended to counter the growing influence of the United States in the 
region and—in light of South China Sea disputes—to provide some 
assurance to those countries that China did not represent a military threat.143  
Other PTAs have aimed to secure access to mineral resources.144  In such 
politically-motivated PTAs, it is not uncommon for China to sacrifice its 
own economic interests by agreeing to terms that are more favorable to its 
trading partners.145 
                                               
139  Suman Modwel & Surendra Singh, The EU-India FTA Negotiations: leading to an 
Agreement or Disagreement?, Group d’Economic Mondiale Policy Brief (Jan. 30, 2012).  
140  Rafael Leal-Arcas, China’s Attitude to Multilateralism in International Economic Law 
and Governance: Challenges for the World Trading System, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 
266 (2010). 
141  Guiguo Wang, China’s FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implications, 105 AM. J. OF 
INT’L L. 508, 508-510 (2011). 
142  FTA News Release, CHINA FTA NETWORK, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/3XW3-D6A6]. 
143  John Ravenhill & Yang Jiang, China’s Move to Preferential Trading: a new direction 
in China’s diplomacy, 18 J. OF CONT. CHINA 32 (2009). 
144  Id. at 33. 
145  For example, the China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) was largely motivated by China’s desire to expand its political influence in 
the region.  In order to facilitate that agreement, China agreed to remove obstacles to ASEAN 
agricultural exports despite the potential for such exports to harm domestic farmers.  See John 
Ravenhill, supra note 141, at 31. 
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The multiplicity of goals pursued by China explains why it has adopted 
a flexible approach to the negotiation of PTAs, tailoring the content of 
agreements to the identity and demands of its counterparts.146  As such, there 
is no one-size-fits-all policy, but rather a hodgepodge of trade agreements 
containing provisions that vary significantly from one case to another. 
However, Chinese PTAs do bear certain common features.  First, they 
focus on the removal of tariff barriers.  In this respect, Chinese PTAs have 
included WTO plus liberalization commitments, especially in trade sectors 
such as agriculture, which have proved difficult to liberalize at the WTO 
level.147  Conversely, trade liberalization commitments in services are harder 
to come by, as China is reluctant to expose its nascent services industry to 
global competition.148 
Second, Chinese PTAs shy away from attempts to include deep 
regulatory disciplines.  Chinese PTAs typically do not contain provisions 
dealing with public procurement, competition, or free movement of capital, 
and references to intellectual property regulation are limited to 
reaffirmations of the parties’ commitments to comply with TRIPS.  Labor 
and environmental issues are also typically eschewed, and the few PTAs that 
do touch on these issues merely refer to the need to comply with existing 
multilateral agreements.149  With respect to investment protection, China 
adopts a flexible approach that is open to incorporating provisions used by 
partners in international investment agreements in their PTAs.  However, 
China still falls short of the standards set in US PTAs and shies away from 
making significant liberalization commitments.150 
In short, China’s PTAs are generally characterized by a reluctance to go 
beyond the current regulatory framework provided by the WTO.  Although 
China is willing to make WTO-plus liberalization commitments, these are 
mostly limited to the area of trade in goods.  China’s PTAs also tend to be 
characterized by shallowness.  Deep integration is generally avoided, and on 
                                               
146  Wang, supra note 139, at 498; Nargiza Salisdjanova, US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, China’s Trade Ambitions: Strategy and Objectives behind China’s 
Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements 15-23 (2015). 
147  Ravenhill, supra note 141, at 31. 
148  Id. at 34. 
149  Nargiza Salisdjanova, supra note 144, at 19. 
150  Axel Berger, German Dev. Inst., Investment Rules in Chinese Preferential Trade and 
Investment Agreements: Is China following global trends towards comprehensive 
agreements? 17-20 (Research Paper, 2013); Fred Bergsten, A Bilateral Investment Treaty and 
Economic Relations between China and the US, in Towards a US-China Investment Treaty, 
PIIE Briefing Paper 15-1, 13 (2015).  
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the rare occasions that regulatory disciplines are referenced, they are usually 
either general in nature (e.g., commitments to comply with existing 
international agreements) or replicate disciplines already developed in PTAs 
signed by Western economies.  There is no attempt to develop new rules and 
disciplines that would deviate significantly from the PTA models developed 
by the likes of the European Union and the United States.  China’s 
preference for shallow agreements is seemingly being adopted by mega-
regional agreements involving China.  For example, the RCEP maintains 
China’s emphasis on the enhancement of market access for goods while 
ignoring most regulatory issues.151 
However, despite its apparent distaste for deep integration, the 
flexibility and pragmatism displayed by China in negotiating PTAs suggests 
that the country’s attachment to shallow integration is by no means set in 
stone.  Where there has been demand from its trading partners, China has 
opened itself up to the prospect of deep integration.152  Moreover, there are 
signs that China is willing to participate in the negotiation of more ambitious 
and comprehensive trade deals.  For example, China has signed PTAs with 
New Zealand and Korea that address issues such as investment, competition 
policy, and e-commerce.153  China has also signaled its desire to be involved 
in talks relating to TiSA,154 and at one point openly considered the prospect 
of joining the TPP.155  Such moves can be explained by a number of factors, 
including China’s desire to avoid discrimination by the countries involved in 
those agreements, China’s ambition to contribute to the development of 
international trade rules, and the need for a spur to China’s ongoing reforms 
in order to make the transition to a market-based economy.  However, the 
United States put a brake on China’s ambitions by ruling out the possibility 
of China joining TPP talks prior to their conclusion, mostly out of fear that 
China would adversely affect the progress of negotiations and oppose many 
                                               
151  Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths 
Towards Deeper Asian Economic Integration, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
359, 359-378 (2013); Ming Du, TPP Agreement – China’s Tripartite Strategy, 18 J. OF 
INT’L ECON. L. 426 (2015). 
152  Heng Wang, Features of China’s Recent FTA and Their Implications: An Anatomy of 
the China-Korea FTA, 11 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 115 (2016).   
153  Longhyue Zhao, China Trade Strategy: FTAs, Mega-Regionals and the WTO, EUR. 
UNIV. INST. RSCAS POL’Y PAPERS, RSCAS PP 2015/11 at 4 (2015). 
154  Trade in Services Agreement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/7C8G-PFSP]. 
155  Kolsky-Lewis, supra note 149, at 372. 
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of the high regulatory standards typically proposed by the United States.156 
III.  EMERGING POINTS OF TENSION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM 
A. Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks? 
The idea that PTAs represent a threat or a stumbling block to 
multilateral trade liberalization is based on Jacob Viner’s work on the effects 
of tariff preferences.  Viner posited that although PTAs have the effect of 
increasing trade between parties, they also generally lead to trade diversion, 
meaning an overall decrease in trade flows.157  This is because the tariff 
advantages resulting from the PTA may divert trade to a party to the 
agreement, even if a non-party is a more efficient producer.  The 
proliferation of PTAs may thus disincentivize efforts to engage in 
multilateral liberalization.  Recognizing the proliferation of PTAs, 
economists such as Jagdhish Bhagwatti have argued that the discriminatory 
liberalization that results from PTAs would discourage countries from 
engaging in multilateral trade liberalization in order to ensure that the 
preferential treatment secured by PTAs is not eroded.158 
But the view that PTAs constitute stumbling blocks rather than building 
blocks to multilateral liberalization is not one that is universally shared 
amongst economists.  Empirical studies indicate that multilateralism and 
regionalism are endogenous processes insofar as involvement in multilateral 
trade liberalization tends to encourage countries to enter into PTAs and vice 
versa.159  Furthermore, most countries have unilaterally engaged in 
significant tariff-cutting since the 1980s, making the possibility of trade 
                                               
156  Du, supra note 149, at 417. 
157  Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, in TRADING BLOCS: ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 105 (J. 
Bhagwati, P. Krishna & A. Panagaryia eds., 1999).  
158  Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism, in TRADING BLOCS: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 3-32 (J. Bhagwati, P. Krishna & A. Panagaryia eds., 1999); World Trade 
Report, The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From co-existence to coherence, WTO 
Doc. (2011), at 166–168. 
159  Caroline Freund, Multilateralism and endogenous formation of preferential trade 
agreements, 52(2) J. INT’L ECON. 359 (2000); Edward D. Mansfield & Eric Reinhardt, 
Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of 
Preferential Trading Arrangements, 57(4) INT’L ORG. 829 (2003); Kamal Saggi & Halis M. 
Yildiz, Bilateralism, multilateralism and the quest for global free trade, 81(1) J. INT’L ECON. 
26 (2010). 
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diversion resulting from tariff-cutting less of a concern.160  It is also argued 
that the “stumbling block” approach is based on the outdated assumption 
that tariff measures remain the biggest barrier to international trade.  
Research has demonstrated that deep PTAs have, by and large, not lead to 
trade diversion, and that most have had a largely positive impact on trade 
exchanges with third-party countries.161 
One of the main factors underlying the absence of trade diversion in 
deep PTAs is that the regulatory discipline of services, competition, and 
intellectual property protection tend to engender less—if any—
discriminatory treatment.  The regulatory reforms triggered by deep PTAs 
are generally adopted in order to establish a more attractive regulatory 
environment for business.  Any regulatory convergence mandated by means 
of a PTA will presumably be of benefit to both nationals of the contracting 
parties and to nationals of non-party countries.162  In fact, some have argued 
that the promotion of global rules in mega-regionals will produce positive 
spillovers for third parties and facilitate global trade.  For example, with 
respect to technical standards, the adoption of common standards by 
countries involved in the TTIP and the TPP means that third parties can 
subscribe to a single set of standards that will ensure access to the largest 
economies in the world.163 
However, this is not to say that the regulatory disciplines included in 
mega-regionals do not present discriminatory elements.  If mega-regional 
PTAs were to generate mutual recognition agreements between parties 
instead of pursuing harmonization, this would lead to discrimination and 
trade diversion, since such arrangements are exclusionary by nature.  In 
addition, the spread of different regulatory preferences through trade 
agreements holds the potential for discrimination.164  As major economies 
                                               
160  Richard Baldwin, 21st Century Regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade 
and 20th century trade rules, WTO Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2011-08, 21. 
161  Petros Mavroidis, Always Look at the Bright Side of Non-Delivery: WTO and 
Preferential Trade Agreements, Yesterday and Today, 10(3) WORLD TRADE REV. 375, 378-79 
(2011). 
 162  Jayant Menon, From Spaghetti Bowl to Jigsaw Puzzle? Fixing the Mess in 
Regional and Global Trade, 1(3) ASIAN & THE PACIFIC POL’Y STUDIES 470, 482 (2014); R. 
Baldwin, supra note 20, at 21; B. Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, Regulatory Spillovers and 
the Trading System: Cooperation to Coherence 8, E15 INITIATIVE (Apr. 2015). 
163  Jim Rollo, et al., Potential Effects of the Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership on Selected Developing Countries, CENTRE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION AT SUSSEX (2013), http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Output/193679/Default.aspx.  
164  CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW AND FINANCIAL 
ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 82 (2014). 
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increasingly require that PTAs adopt their own regulatory positions, there is 
a danger that competing regulatory blocs are created.  This can have the 
effect of further entrenching divergent regulatory positions, leading to 
discriminatory treatment and the undermining of efforts to negotiate 
solutions at the multilateral level.165 
The materialization of an international trading system divided along the 
lines of the interests and preferences of major economic powers fits neatly 
with Burke-White’s contention that the international legal system is veering 
towards a “multi-hub” structure.166  In this structure, various states can 
exercise leadership and shape the development of international legal rules by 
putting forward distinct views of international law, which reflect their 
national preferences.167  As less powerful states naturally gravitate towards 
hubs that best address their own interests, a new form of substantive 
pluralism will develop, which enhances flexibility and contests the unitary 
vision of international law based on the preferences of the United States and 
the European Union.168  Applied to the context of the international trading 
system, the multi-hub system suggests the development of—at the very 
least—two hubs representing differing views of what international trade law 
should look like in the twenty-first century: (1) the EU and US-backed 
vision of a trading system that protects assets and facilitates the movement 
of goods, services, capital, and persons in global value chains; and (2) the 
BRIC-backed vision of a trading system that echoes GATT 1947 by placing 
emphasis on state sovereignty and regulatory autonomy. 
However, the multi-hub system fails to fully capture recent 
developments in international trade relations because the competing 
normative visions being offered by the different hubs are not necessarily 
exclusive.  Subscribing to the rules of one particular hub does not impair 
one’s ability to participate in a separate hub.  It is indeed perfectly possible 
for a state to simultaneously participate in both hub systems, as 
demonstrated by the fact that many parties to the TPP are also willing 
partakers in the negotiations of the RCEP.  Additionally, China itself has 
expressed a desire to be involved in the negotiations of plurilateral 
agreements such as the TiSA and has even countenanced the possibility of 
                                               
 165  G. Prada & A. Rossi, The Regulatory Framework of Regional Trade Agreements, 
in MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR GLOBALIZATION: WTO AND FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 175-200 (Wonhyuk Lim & Ramon Torrent eds., 2005). 
166  William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment 
and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (2015). 
167  Id. at 37. 
168  Id. 
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joining the TPP in the past.169 
The long-term ramifications of these developments for the international 
trading system remain to be seen.  One possible scenario is that the hubs 
provided by the large emerging economies will be unable to shield weaker 
states from the push towards deeper integration.  Because of their bargaining 
power, the European Union and the United States—as well as other 
advanced economies—could gradually impose their regulatory preferences 
on such countries.  Instead of the emergence of competing regulatory blocs 
that undermine multilateralism, what we may see is a trend towards global 
convergence in line with the EU/US model, except for those countries whose 
economies are large enough to resist it.170  This process towards global 
convergence would accelerate should countries like China choose to join the 
TPP.  Another scenario is the emergence of a more fragmented international 
trading system where countries select hubs depending on the model of 
economic integration that best reflects their interests.  Developed countries 
and developing countries seeking to participate higher up the global supply 
chains may wish to attach themselves to deep and comprehensive mega-
PTAs, while those lower down the chain may be tempted to stick to shallow 
trade agreements that enable them to maintain policy autonomy. 
B. Deep Integration and the Loss of Regulatory Autonomy 
The incremental diffusion of global regulatory disciplines found in EU 
and US trade deals may smooth the path for future multilateralization, but it 
also means that the regulatory agenda in the sphere of international trade law 
will be set by just a handful of international actors.  Here, there is a sense of 
history repeating itself.  As discussed above, one of the main obstacles 
impeding WTO domestic regulatory reform was the conviction shared by 
most developing countries that domestic reforms triggered by the conclusion 
of the various WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round were not necessarily 
welfare-enhancing.171  Beyond the costs involved in ensuring compliance 
with WTO law and the lack of resources to effectively carry out such 
reforms, many of these reforms also seemed purely intended to protect the 
offensive interests of developed countries.  Today, the regulatory disciplines 
that are being promoted in trade agreements (e.g., intellectual property, 
                                               
169  S. Tiezzi, Will China Join the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 10, 
2016), http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/will-china-join-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ 
[https://perma.cc/KUB3-TTYX]. 
170  Baldwin, WTO 2.0: Governance of 21st Trade, supra note 24, at 281. 
171  See, e.g., Finger, supra note 37; Gallagher, supra note 38. 
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investment, labor, environment, and competition) are mainly those that were 
rejected by developing countries in the context of the Doha Round.  In the 
Doha Round, actors like the European Union presented the adoption of deep 
disciplines as beneficial to developing countries, the idea being that trade 
liberalization should be underpinned by an overarching regulatory 
framework that would allow countries to better realize gains from trade 
liberalization while simultaneously taking into account other non-trade 
objectives, such as the promotion of environmental and social standards.172  
Similarly, the current wave of trade deals is also being packaged in pro-
development language.  For example, the former  US Trade Representative, 
Michael Froman, recently put forward the idea that the high level of 
standards enshrined in the TPP not only reflected the country’s interests and 
values but also underlies a broader reform agenda promoting sustainable 
development and competitive market reforms.”173  On the other side of the 
pond, some have described the TTIP as a “unique chance to structure 
globalization more fairly [by setting] minimum ecological and economic 
standards for the entire world.”174 
Yet the idea that the uniform regulatory disciplines required under these 
trade agreements are beneficial to all has long been disputed.  When the 
WTO was still in its infancy, observers such as Roessler were keen to stress 
that it would be wrong to assume that the harmonization of domestic policies 
and rules on a global scale would increase efficiency, not least because 
regulatory divergences between states reflected “differences in values, tastes 
and circumstances.”175  More recently, the New Development Economics 
movement has rejected the one-size-fits-all approach adopted in trade 
politics and called for policies to be tailored towards the particular contexts 
                                               
172  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a global 
partnership for sustainable development, at 7, COM(2002) 82 final (Feb. 13, 2002). With 
respect to the US see Evenett & Meier, supra note 53. 
173  Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Negotiations Aim to Raise Labor and Environmental 
Standards - A Conversation on the President’s Trade Agenda with Michael Froman, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/trade/us-trade-negotiations-aim-raise-labor-
environmental-standards/p35681.  
174  Dario Sarmadi, TTIP is ‘big bonanza’ for developing countries, EU claims, EURACTIV 
(Jan. 23, 2016) (Erika Korner trans.),  http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-
policy/ttip-big-bonanza-developing-countries-eu-claims-311507 [https://perma.cc/5DP4-
5YLA].  
175  Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in 
FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE 22, 46 (Jagdish Bhagwatti 
& Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
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and needs of developing nations.176  The experience of developing countries 
in the implementation of TRIPS serves as a perfect illustration of the need 
for this more tailored approach.  To the extent that technologies protected by 
intellectual property rights originate mostly from developed countries, 
TRIPS had the effect of generating revenues for the latter while creating a 
cost for developing nations who had to pay to access technologies developed 
elsewhere.177  In addition, high levels of intellectual property protection 
have been shown to stunt economic development by impeding the transfer of 
technologies.178  Another example concerns the linking of international trade 
rules and labor rights, which is often suggested by human rights advocates 
keen to raise global labor standards as well as exporters (mostly from 
developed countries) wishing to remove the competitive advantages enjoyed 
by firms who operate in countries where the cost of labor is low.179 
However, the rationale for the imposition of global labor standards in 
international trade rules is very much disputed.  First, from a political 
economy perspective, requiring an increase in labor standards abroad seems 
at odds with the idea that trade liberalization is intended to allow countries to 
exploit their respective comparative advantages.  Rather than leveling the 
playing field, the incorporation of labor standards in international trade rules 
can be construed as a protectionist move designed to remove one of the very 
few competitive advantages developing countries have over their developed 
counterparts.180  Second, it is not a given that raising minimum labor 
standards will produce optimal results in developing countries.  Developed 
countries adopt high standards because there is a demand from their 
constituents to do so and because they can absorb the ensuing costs.  In 
contrast, developing countries are in no position to demand or achieve the 
                                               
176  For an overview of literature on New Development Economics, see Michael Trebilock, 
Between Theories of Trade and Development: The Future of the World Trading System, 16 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 122 (2015). See also Donatella Alessandrini, WTO at a crossroads: 
The Crisis of Multilateral Trade and the Political Economy of the Flexibility Debate, 5 TRADE 
L. AND DEV. 256 (2013). 
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PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 (2003); Dilip K. Das, Intellectual Property Rights and the Doha Round, 8 
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.  33 (2005); Raphael Kaplinsky, Spreading the gains from 
globalization: what can be learned from value-chain analysis? 47 PROBLS. OF ECON. 
TRANSITION  74 (2004). 
178  SELL, supra note 175, at 9. 
179  Robert E. Hudec, Introduction, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PRE-REQUISITES 
FOR FREE TRADE? 1 (Robert E. Hudec & Jagdish Bhagwati eds.,  1996). 
180  Göte Hansson, Trade and Labour Standards, THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 279, 285 (Kenneth Heydon & Stephen Woolcock eds.,  2012). 
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“trade-off between monetary and non-monetary wealth.”181  These examples 
illustrate the most problematic aspect of the drive to diffuse ever-increasing 
standards in trade agreements globally: they are based on the assumption that 
the policies that worked for advanced economies will necessarily work in 
different environments.  By increasing policy constraints, these standards 
actually undermine the ability of developing countries to experiment with 
policies that may better suit their particular circumstances, thus inhibiting 
their ability to enhance their growth and immersion into the global economy. 
It would be wrong to present the loss of policy autonomy resulting from 
trade agreements as a problem that only affects developing countries.  
Advanced economies are also adversely affected, and increasingly question 
the judiciousness of subscribing to international trade agreements that limit 
their ability to regulate autonomously.  Two very clear examples of this can 
be found in the context of the ongoing TTIP negotiations, first in regulatory 
cooperation and second in investment protection.  The European Union has 
earmarked financial services as a key area in which it would like to pursue 
regulatory cooperation with the United States.  The goal would be to 
establish an institutional process through which the parties would work to 
ensure the implementation of international standards, conduct mutual 
consultations in advance of new financial measures that may impact the 
supply of financial services, examine where existing rules may constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade, and assess the extent to which their respective 
rules on financial services are equivalent in outcomes.182  The main 
objective of cooperation in this area would be to secure the recognition of 
equivalence in financial standards.  This is of particular importance for EU 
financial services providers who would like to access the lucrative US 
market without having to comply with more stringent US prudential rules 
embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act.183  Predictably, however, US trade 
officials have given such proposals short shrift, namely because of concerns 
that cooperation may lead to a lowering of existing standards.  Recent 
reports also indicate that negotiations on regulatory cooperation in other 
                                               
181  GARY BURTLESS ET AL., GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 122 
(1998). 
182  EU - US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): 
Cooperation on Financial Services Regulation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Jan. 27, 2014, at 5, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152101.pdf [https://perma.cc/85JN-
XBDF].  
183  S. Johnson and J. Schott, Financial Services in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership 4, 5 (Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Briefs PB13-26, 
2013). 
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sectors (e.g., car safety, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals) have been beset by 
similar disagreements, and that the parties are currently considering leaving 
them out of the agreement altogether.184  The experience of the European 
Union and the United States in negotiating the TTIP illustrates that even in 
the context of negotiations between like-minded trade powers, the regulatory 
mistrust that persists between nations renders any proposal for regulatory 
convergence or significant cooperation a difficult sell. 
Another example of the difficulties in agreeing converging regulatory 
disciplines in PTAs between advanced industrialized nations can be found in 
the TTIP and the CETA investment protection chapters.  The European 
Union has faced criticism from the public, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and politicians, with many arguing that the investment protection 
standards and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism will 
undermine the ability of member states to legislate in pursuit of public 
interest objectives.  Such skepticism fits with the general criticism leveled at 
bilateral investment treaties in the post-colonial era, which were viewed as 
being too geared towards liberalization and foreign investment protection 
enhancement, with no thought given to how the rights of investors may have 
impacted the ability of host countries to regulate in the public interest.  The 
issue recently arose when the federal government of Wallonia in Belgium 
threatened to block the signing of the CETA because of concerns associated 
with the potential impact of ISDS on regulatory autonomy.185 
In sum, the rationale for deep integration through trade agreements is 
contested both by developed and developing countries.  Developed country 
governments promoting mega-PTAs are increasingly being forced to fend 
off accusations that these agreements lower regulatory standards and reduce 
the ability of governments to pursue public interest objectives.  At the same 
time, the experience of developing countries in the WTO has shown that the 
implementation of certain rules can not only be prohibitively expensive and 
time-consuming, but can also run counter to the economic and social 
interests of such countries.  With respect to developing countries, the 
                                               
184  Bernd Riegert, Is TTIP in Crisis?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.dw.com/en/is-ttip-in-crisis/a-19070989 [https://perma.cc/3MTH-Y3KC]. 
185  Wallonia is Adamantly Blocking the CETA, THE ECONOMIST, 46 (Oct. 22, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21709060-tiny-region-belgium-opposes-trade-
reasons-are-hard-understand-wallonia [https://perma.cc/C5VF-PZCK]; Natalia Drozdiak et 
al., EU Sets Belgium an Ultimatum on CETA, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2016); Arthur 
Beesley, EU and Canada Sign Deal Amid Fears About Future of Trade Policy, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/450bea68-9d9f-11e6-86d5-4e36b35c3550 
[https://perma.cc/W587-RMYR]. 
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fragmentation of the international trading system may lessen concerns 
regarding the loss of policy autonomy.  Bilateralism, plurilateralism, and 
regionalism make sense, not just because of the paralysis currently affecting 
the WTO, but also because the brand of deep integration being pursued by 
the likes of the European Union and the United States is better suited to 
“small group” negotiations between countries that share common interests 
and preferences.186  By contrast, developing countries that do not wish to 
subject themselves to constraining regulatory disciplines can choose not to 
participate and thus maintain their policy autonomy to develop competitive 
advantages in certain areas.  For example, this could conceivably be 
achieved by adopting a soft-touch approach to intellectual property 
protection and enforcement to facilitate the growth of technology intensive 
industries, or by subsidizing national industries until such time as they can 
become competitive on the global stage.187  The downside to fragmentation 
is that, by effectively circumventing low-income countries from the process, 
there is a danger that global rules and standards are being set that neither 
fulfill the needs of third-party countries or the global trading system at large. 
C. What’s Next for the International Trading System? 
Reports of the WTO’s impending demise are, of course, greatly 
exaggerated.  It is true that the multilateral trading system is being contested, 
but the relative success of the 2015 WTO Nairobi Ministerial Conference188 
shows that it is still an organization with much to offer in the development of 
international trade rules.  For all its flaws and limitations, the WTO remains 
the centerpiece of global trade governance.189  The WTO imposes legally 
binding liberalization commitments and global disciplines in a wide number 
of key trade related issues, from subsidies and dumping to investment and 
intellectual property.  Moreover, the size of the WTO’s membership and its 
ability to issue binding rulings means that as a venue for trade regulation, the 
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187  Dan Ciuriak & Hasha Varfhana Singh, Mega-regional Trade Agreements: How 
Excluded Countries Can Meet the Challenge, IISD Report 9 (2015), 
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WTO offers certain advantages with which PTAs cannot compete.  Any rule 
negotiated under the WTO will have a wider reach and a bigger impact than 
those included in PTAs. 
But while the WTO remains relevant, one must also recognize that in a 
world where domestic regulation is becoming a primary focus in trade 
politics, countries wishing to pursue deep integration will inevitably shift to 
different and smaller venues.  The idea that the WTO, in its current form, 
could replicate what was achieved in the Uruguay Round is neither realistic 
nor desirable.  It makes sense that advanced economies boasting similar 
levels of economic development and sharing historical, cultural, and social 
preferences should pursue deeper forms of integration through PTAs.  
However, there is no point in corralling poorer countries into signing 
agreements that they lack the capability, resources, and political drive to 
implement, given that such regulatory reforms could undermine key public 
interest objectives and developmental goals.  All this is not to say that the 
WTO should not continue to play an important role in tackling regulatory 
trade barriers.  Indeed, while it seems that the regulatory disciplines included 
in deep PTAs will not, for the most part, lead to trade diversion, the WTO 
can help minimize the risk of market segmentation that could potentially 
result from the entrenchment of clashing regulatory preferences in PTAs.  
An obvious reform proposal would be for the WTO to fully embrace 
variable geometry by letting go of the consensus rule under Article X:9 of 
the WTO Agreement so as to facilitate the conclusion of plurilateral 
agreements within the WTO.190  Bernard Hoekman suggests in this regard 
that the requirement of a two-thirds majority for the opening of negotiations 
on plurilateral agreements would remove the ability of a small number of 
WTO members to block negotiations, while at the same time ensuring that 
issues viewed as problematic by a substantial pool of members would not 
make their way into WTO law.191  The advantage of plurilateral agreements 
compared to PTAs is that the former are open to the entire WTO 
                                               
190  Andrew Cornford, Variable Geometry for the WTO: Concepts and Precedents, 
UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 171 (2004), http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20045_en.pdf 
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Multilateralism, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 80 (2005); Craig Van Grasstek & Pierre Sauvé, The 
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Geometry?, 9(4) J. INT’L ECON. L., 837 (2006); Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, WTO 
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J. INT’L L. 319, 336 (2015). 
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membership, meaning that all WTO Members (irrespective of geographical 
location and level of development) could potentially participate and 
contribute to the shaping of rules. 
In addition to variable geometry, a number of proposals have been put 
forward concerning the possibility of developing regulatory cooperation and 
transparency mechanisms within the WTO framework.192  As seen in the 
context of PTAs, by enabling the identification of best regulatory practices 
through the mutual exchange of information and experiences between 
regulators, regulatory cooperation mechanisms could help illuminate areas 
where deep integration could realistically be envisaged at the mutilateral or 
plurilateral level.  It could also enhance the capacity of WTO Members to 
efficiently implement such rules domestically.193  Aaditya Mattoo and 
Hoekman have proposed setting up “Knowledge Platforms” aimed at 
“fostering a substantive, evidence/analysis ‐based discussion of the impa  
of sector ‐specific regulatory policies       
understanding of where there are large potential gains from opening markets 
to greater competition, the preconditions for realizing such gains, and 
options to address possible negative distributional consequences of policy 
reforms.”194  Hoekman has also called for the creation of WTO “Supply 
Chain Councils” that would be tasked with examining supply chains 
associated with key products and the regulatory policies that could help 
reduce trade costs. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the WTO should use the experience 
of PTAs in addressing regulatory trade barriers to spot rules and practices 
that could be exported to the WTO.  This could be achieved by increasing 
the transparency of PTAs at the WTO level.  Currently, the WTO’s 
Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements merely requires 
that the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) receives 
notification of PTAs.  The Committee then delivers a factual description of 
the content of such agreements to WTO Members, who are permitted to 
submit questions to the PTA parties who they are obligated to answer.  This 
                                               
192  See Robert Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries and the WTO, 2 
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process culminates with a formal meeting at which the PTA is discussed, but 
no assessment is made as to the consistency of the PTA with WTO law.195  
Petros Mavroidis has proposed reforming the transparency mechanism to 
allow the CRTA to conduct comparative and in-depth analyses of the rules 
and the impact of PTAs of which it is notified.196 
These proposals are all intended to ensure that the WTO maintains a 
role in the development of the rules of international trade by addressing 
regulatory trade barriers in a manner that reflects the interests of the entire 
WTO membership rather than just those of a few.  In the quest to iron out 
problematic regulatory divergences, the WTO must also develop 
mechanisms that take into account the need for flexibility when imposing 
common regulatory frameworks at a global level.  Variable geometry, by 
way of plurilateral agreements, allows reluctant WTO Members to avoid 
further integration. In all likelihood, however, the rules negotiated in these 
agreements will be held as global standards to which the reluctant Members 
will at some point be compelled to subscribe.197  In light of the problems 
associated with the one-size-fits-all approach to prescriptive regulation and 
the high costs of implementing regulatory reforms en masse, it may also be 
worth considering introducing an element of differentiation within WTO 
plurilateral agreements.  Differentiation would facilitate the integration of 
developing countries into regulatory frameworks by allowing for their 
gradual subscription to WTO rules depending on their level of economic 
development.  One fairly straightforward solution would be to draw 
inspiration from the Reference Paper, which gives WTO members the option 
to select which specific regulatory principles they wish to be bound by, or 
even to modify the Reference Paper in their commitments so as to reflect 
their particular interests and needs.198 
Thomas Cottier has proposed an alternative (or complementary) 
solution based upon the concept of “graduation,” which allows for the 
“differential and progressive application of suitable norms commensurable 
with the level of competitiveness of industries and sector concerned” within 
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individual WTO members.199  Graduation would permit countries to 
progressively sign up to various WTO regulatory principles, rules, and 
standards, depending on whether they meet a series of predetermined 
economic thresholds that would take into account the country’s level of 
economic development as well as the state of the industry impacted by the 
WTO rules in that particular country.200  This may result, for example, in the 
delayed application of WTO rules by a country determined to not have the 
capability to implement those rules, or exemptions for certain industries that 
are not deemed sufficiently competitive within the country.201 
At the time of writing, there is little to suggest that the WTO is 
considering any of the aforementioned proposals, or that it is even set to 
change its modus operandi in a significant way.  Nevertheless, the 
mechanisms explored in this Article could be implemented and incorporated 
into PTAs.  A case in point is the TiSA, whose proponents may wish to 
consider incorporating flexibility and assistance instruments in favor of 
developing countries in order to command wider support from the WTO 
membership.  Though broad, many of the pro-competitive regulatory 
disciplines that are to be included in the TiSA have the potential to 
significantly undermine regulatory autonomy.202  Providing for 
differentiation within the TiSA by allowing developing countries to reflect in 
their schedules the rules to which they wish to be bound provides them with 
the flexibility to tailor regulatory disciplines to national circumstances and 
priorities. 
An additional factor that has played a key role in undermining efforts 
towards multilateral trade liberalization in services is the fear harbored by 
governments that opening domestic markets could prove detrimental to the 
national economy if not accompanied by the adoption of appropriate 
regulatory standards to ensure that countries are able to reap the rewards of 
liberalization and that equity concerns are addressed.203  In this context, 
domestic regulatory reform to improve the contestability of markets and 
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address equity concerns is a prerequisite for the opening of services markets.  
The TiSA could accommodate these concerns by establishing legal and 
institutional frameworks that would ensure that regulatory reforms 
undertaken by developing countries in compliance with the agreement are 
facilitated and supported by the membership through technical assistance 
and capacity building mechanisms. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on how the international trading system has 
struggled to address demands to negotiate regulatory barriers, and the 
fragmentation of the system that has thus resulted.  But this is not the only 
issue currently undermining multilateral trade governance.  The WTO 
membership is also divided on a number of “traditional” trade issues, from 
disagreements on farm subsidies between the European Union and China204 
to schisms between developing countries on market access issues.205 
However, recent events have given supporters of the WTO some cause 
for optimism.  In December 2013, the WTO Members agreed on the so-
called Bali Package, which includes deals on key trade-facilitation issues for 
developing countries such as duty-free and quota-free treatment for all goods 
originating from the least developed countries.  This was followed by an 
additional package agreed upon in early December 2015 at the WTO’s Tenth 
Ministerial Conference held in Nairobi, which included a commitment to end 
export subsidies and expand the plurilateral International Technology 
Agreement (ITA).  WTO Director General Roberto Azevedo claimed that 
these were historic agreements that demonstrated the organization’s ability 
to deliver “major, multilaterally-negotiated outcomes.”  The chair of the 
conference, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, Amina Mohamed, went further, boasting that these agreements had 
“reaffirmed the central role of the WTO in international trade governance.”  
However, while the Bali and Nairobi packages are of some significance, 
especially for developing countries, they do fall short of achieving the grand 
ambitions of the Doha Round.  The packages ignore key issues such as 
agricultural markets access, domestic subsidies, and anti-dumping measures, 
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and they do little to address demands from developed countries.  In fact, US 
Trade Representative Michael Froman set the prevailing narrative for the 
Nairobi Ministerial Conference when he called for the membership to move 
beyond the strictures of Doha.206  It was a message that was reflected in the 
Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, which recognized that although many 
members reaffirmed the Doha Development Agenda, others were keen to 
explore different approaches and issues.207 
Whether these new approaches entail a shift away from the single 
undertaking fixation and towards variable geometry within the WTO 
remains to be seen.  What seems increasingly clear, however, is that a 
significant portion of the WTO’s membership has moved on.  Regulatory 
issues have replaced traditional market access barriers as the main focus of 
developed-country trade policy, and these countries are perfectly happy to 
pursue such interests through PTAs.  At this stage, it is hard to determine 
how this “contestation” of the multilateral trade regime will affect the future 
of the international trading system, for several reasons.  First, it is by no 
means a certainty that these agreements will enter into effect.  Mega-PTAs 
may be used to contest the multilateral trade regime, but mega-PTAs are also 
being challenged domestically, with trade policy moving to the center of the 
political debate and trade agreements increasingly blamed—rightly or 
wrongly—for all types of ills including unemployment and the lowering of 
regulatory standards.208  Certainly, the growing popularity of anti-trade 
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rhetoric in the European Union and the United States suggests that the 
likelihood of mega-regionals such as the TTIP being ratified in the short to 
medium term is remote.209  That being said, the rejection of the TPP and 
apparent stalling of the TTIP is unlikely to stop the use of PTAs as tools to 
promote regulatory disciplines that go beyond WTO law.  For example, in 
the EU, whilst the TTIP has faced heavy criticism, the negotiation of similar 
(in terms of content) but less-publicized agreements such as the EU-Japan 
PTA, are proceeding without much in the way of public opposition.210  
Another important mega-PTA, the CETA, has faced some obstruction within 
the European Union211 but has since been ratified by the European 
Parliament and is currently awaiting ratification by Canada before it can be 
provisionally applied.212  With respect to the United States, much of the 
criticism levelled by the Trump administration against the TPP is based on 
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misgivings concerning traditional market access issues,213 rather than the 
regulatory component of the agreement.  Therefore, as the United States 
moves towards a bilateral approach to trade agreements, it is fairly likely that 
future US FTAs will continue to replicate the TPP’s approach as far as 
regulatory issues are concerned.  In other words, the venue for the 
contestation of the multilateral trading system may change, but the substance 
of that contestation will remain the same. 
Second, the outcome of this fragmentation of international trade law and 
the return to power-based politics is hard to predict.  The trade rules 
proposed by developed countries may eventually be embraced by the large 
emerging economies and lead to the establishment of a WTO 2.0.214 
However, they could just as easily further cement existing divisions between 
developed nations and the countries that feel compelled to align their 
regulatory standards to developed nation rules, and large emerging 
economies that are unwilling to subscribe to such rules and low income 
countries that do not participate in global value chains.  In either scenario, 
the most likely losers from the contestation of the multilateral trade regime 
will be weaker developing economies, who will not only be excluded from 
the rule-making process, but will also find themselves with no choice but to 
adopt regulatory standards that may not address their specific circumstances 
and needs. 
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